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COMMENT
SHOULD TENDER OFFER ARBITRAGE BE
REGULATED?
Arbitrageurs, often viewed as "vague shadows with European
backgrounds,"' are silently at work in most tender offers, in many cases
controlling their outcome. This Comment will examine the activities of
tender offer arbitrageurs, which are presently unregulated, and will ex-
plore the need for new regulations to restore a balance to the tender
offer process.
The Comment first reviews the origins and development of arbi-
trage in its various forms and then focuses upon the mechanics of arbi-
trage in the specific context of the tender offer process. The arguments
traditionally advanced in justification of the role of arbitrage in tender
offers are then critically examined in light of the theory of efficient cap-
ital markets, the present imbalance of tender offer regulation and the
long-term economic effects of tender offer arbitrage as it is currently
practiced. Finally, the Comment seeks to provide a focal point for
future debate by suggesting an approach to be taken in developing an
effective system to regulate the role of arbitrage in the tender offer
process.
I. THE MECHANICS AND DEVELOPMENT OF ARBITRAGE
A. The Classic Forms of Arbitrage.
The term "arbitrage" is derived from the French verb "arbitrer,"
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meaning "to measure, determine, judge or estimate."' In financial cir-
cles, arbitrage is the science of measuring and comparing price differen-
tials and exploiting them for a profit. In an elementary sense,
everyone is an arbitrageur. When the thrifty shopper compares gro-
cery prices to maximize his shopping dollar, he engages in arbitrage in
its most basic form.
Arbitrage in the "classic" sense was first observed, in the late medi-
eval period among Venetian merchants, who bought and sold inter-
changeable currencies in order to profit from price differentials
prevailing between markets? A refined version of this classic form of
arbitrage, which is still practiced on international money markets, has
been facilitated by .the development of better-organized markets and
highly sophisticated communications networks.4
In the past century, the growth of the securities market in the
United States and the increasing use and popularity of various types of
convertible securities5 have led to a further application of the arbitrage
principle. Unlike arbitrage in currencies, this newer form of arbitrage
relies for its success not upon price differentials between markets, but
upon differentials between parities of equivalent securities6 in the same
market.7 This form of arbitrage normally involves the simultaneous
purchase of a convertible security with the short sale8 of its equivalent.
The arbitrageur looks for convertible securities whose equivalents have
parities9 in excess of the current market value of the convertible securi-
2. See H. DEUTSCH, ARBITRAGE 1 (3d ed. 1933); M. WEINSTEIN, ARBITRAGE IN SECURI-
TIES 1 (lst ed. 1931). Seegenerall, 1 THE OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 425 (1933) (discussion
of the word "arbitrage" and its origins).
3. M. WEINSTEIN, supra note 2, at 3-6; Wyser-Pratte 7.
4. Wyster-Pratte 7-8.
5. A convertible security is a security which, by its terms, may be exchanged for another
security in accordance with a specified formula. Examples of such securities include rights, war-
rants, convertible bonds, convertible debentures and convertible preferred stock.
6. A security has as its equivalent a second security if the holder of the first security has the
option of exchanging or converting it into a specified amount of the second security. This is
typically a one-way process, unlike the convertibility of currencies in foreign exchange markets.
EVANS 22; M. WEINSTEIN, supra note 2, at 66-67; Henry 467.
7. EvANs 21; Wyser-Pratte 8.
8. "Selling short" involves the sale of securities which one does not presently own. Shares
are borrowed, at a fee, for delivery to the purchaser, and the trader must subsequently "cover" his
short position by purchasing like securities which are returned to the lender. See Henry 467 n.8.
9. 'Parity" denotes the total or "work-out" value of a particular package of securities
equivalent to a given security. For example, if the Class A 4-1/2% subordinated debentures of X
corporation, presently selling at $1,000, are convertible into Xcommon and preferred stock at a
ratio of 17 shares of common and 7.2 shares of preferred per debenture, and if current market
prices for common and preferred are, respectively, $37.25 and $52.75, then parity value for the
equivalent of one $1,000 debenture is (17 x 37.25) + (7.2 x 52.75) = $1,013. For a more exhaus-
tive discussion of parity computation, replete with examples, see Wyser-Pratte 15-16, 75-87.
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ties. ° He then buys long in a convertible security, sells short the
equivalent, converts his holdings and covers his short sale, realizing a
profit after brokerage and specialist fees (if any), transfer taxes, SEC
fees and the cost of capital."
The price differentials exploited by this form of arbitrage do not
persist for long and usually represent only temporary lags on the part
of the covertible security in catching up with changes in the price of its
equivalent. Moreover, the price differential is usually so small as to
make this form of arbitrage profitable only for those who can deal in
volume with low transaction costs.
B. The Evolution of Risk Arbitrage.
Both types of arbitrage mentioned above are relatively riskless.12
Since the purchases and sales involved take place simultaneously, the
arbitrageur locks in his profit margin and runs no risk of setbacks due
to market fluctuations. For that reason, however, the profit margin in
such transactions is seldom large.13 The real opportunity for profit lies
with risk arbitrage. 4
The development of risk arbitrage in the United States can be
traced primarily to the numerous railroad reorganizations that oc-
curred in the late 1930s and early 1940s as a result of the Depression.'-
Typically, the plan for such a reorganization provided for the exchange
of existing equity and debt securities for packages of newly issued se-
curities containing such diverse elements as common stock, preferred
stock, bonds, debentures, warrants and rights.' 6 Inherent in these reor-
10. EvANs 25.
11. Id 25-27; ARANow & E1NHORN 175-76; Henry 467.
12. ARANow & EINHORN 174.
13. See Wall Street's Highest Rollers, TIME, Oct. 17, 1977, at 54, where it is noted that classic
or riskless arbitrage is still practiced, but that profits are "tiny." This is a corollary of the funda-
mental proposition that large returns are normally associated with greater risks. See notes 77-80
infra and text accompanying notes 77-83 infra for a discussion of risk in the related context of
security price formation.
14. Id See Ehrbar, How to Play the Arbitrage Game, FORTUNE, July 1976, at 83 (discussing
arbitrageur profits on several mergers, id 83-86, and observing that arbitrageur profits are "im-
mense when computed at annual rates," Id 84); Hershman, Arbitrage-Headlest Game in the
Street, DUN's REv., June 1969, at 52 (some risk arbitrageurs made profits exceeding 100% per
year and that "if the risk is high, so is the potential return," id); Tracy, 4 Killing in Babcock &
Wilcox, FORTUNE, Oct. 1977, at 266 (explaining how arbitrageurs made more than $30 million
during the recent takeover of Babcock and Wilcox by McDermott); Arbitrage." It's the Hottest
Game in Town, Bus. WEEK, Jan. 17, 1977, at 71 (describing the large profits made by various risk
arbitrageurs on mergers and acquisitions in 1976 and noting that "Itihe potential for profit in risk
arbitrage is enormous," id).
15. ARANow & EINHORN 176; Wyser-Pratte 8.
16. See, ag., EvANs, giving examples of typical railroad reorganization schemes and discuss-
ing the arbitrageur's role. Id. 24-25. The author shows how to construct a table of "related
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ganization plans was the risk of nonapproval by either shareholders,
creditors,17 a federal court 8 or the Interstate Commerce Commission. 19
This element of risk resulted in a market where, prior to final approval
of the reorganization plan, existing securities traded lower than the par-
ity value of the proposed package of securities traded on a "when-is-
sued" basis.2 0 Arbitrageurs willing to assume this risk were able to
reap large profits.
A second important impetus for the development of risk arbitrage
was the 1935 Public Utility Holding Company Act.2" The Act re-
quired many public utilities to divest themselves of subsidiary hold-
ings.2 Consequently, markets developed for the newly proposed
issues of stock on a "when-issued" basis. An arbitrageur adept at
gauging the effect of divestiture on parent company stock prices and
willing to assume the attendant risks could profit where the parity value
of the "when-issued" package plus the projected value of parent com-
pany stock after the distribution exceeded the before-distribution price
of parent company stock.
A more recent opportunity for application of the risk arbitrage
values" for such a transaction, id. 43-46, and discusses problems of supply and demand which
may arise, id. 69-74.
17. A railroad reorganization plan, to become effective under Chapter VIII of the Bank-
ruptcy Act, ordinarily must be approved by creditors whose claims constitute at least two-thirds in
value of all claims against the debtor and, if the debtor is solvent, by a majority of the sharehold-
ers of each class of stock to which the plan must be submitted. Bankruptcy Act § 77(e), 11 U.S.C.
§ 205(e) (1970). However, a federal district court judge may, in certain cases, confirm the plan
despite shareholder or creditor disapproval, where those who rejected the plan will receive "fair
and equitable" treatment and where such rejection is not reasonably justified in the light of all
relevant facts and surrounding circumstances. Id
18. A federal district court, before approving a railroad reorganization plan, must find, inter
alia, that the plan conforms to the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act, is "fair and equitable" and
does not discriminate unfairly against any of the various classes of affected creditors and share-
holders. Id
19. The Interstate Commerce Commission has extensive control over a proposed plan of
reorganization. For example, the Commission must hold public hearings on the plan and subse-
quently render a report either approving the proposed plan, or a modified version thereof, or in
some cases refusing to approve any plan. Approval and certification by the Commission are
necessary before the district court can proceed to approve and/or confirm the plan. Bankruptcy
Act § 77(d), 11 U.S.C. § 205(d) (1970).
20. ARANOw & EINHORN 176; Wyser-Pratte 8. "'When-issued trading' is trading in unis-
sued securities which is effected in contemplation of their issuance; a dealer simply makes a con-
tract to sell the securities to anothdr dealer or to an ordinary customer 'when, as and if issued."
1 L. Loss, SEcunRTiEs REGULATION 221 (2d ed. 1961). "When-issued" trading is similar in many
respects to short sales of securities and to futures trading on the commodities market. It is subject
to relatively complex regulation, and in some cases prohibition, under the various securities laws,
SEC regulations and stock exchange rules, a subject beyond the scope of this Comment. See
generally id 221-22, 802-04 and corresponding pages in 1969 Supplement.
21. 15 U.S.C. §§ 79 to 79z-6 (1976). See ARANOW & EINHoRN 176; Wyser-Pratte 8-9.
22. 15 U.S.C. § 79k (1976).
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principle was presented by the "merger movement" of the 1960s. 23  In
a merger situation, arbitrageurs focus upon assessing the various risks
affecting the likelihood of consummation of the merger. A thorough
evaluation of such factors as information regarding the stage of negoti-
ations, possible adverse tax rulings, the likelihood of obtaining the req-
uisite shareholder approval, and potential SEC or antitrust problems
enables arbitrageurs to arrive at a price they can afford to pay for the
securities of the "bride" while still allowing a margin for profit and
absorption of risk.24
C. Tender Offer Arbitrage.
The rapid increase in tender offers in the past twenty years25 has
provided the perfect climate for a new and highly profitable application
of the arbitrage principle. Professional risk arbitrageurs, consisting al-
most exclusively of an elite group of Wall Street investment bankers,26
23. Wyser-Pratte 9.
24. See id 11-33 for a general discussion of merger arbitrage. See also text accompanying
notes 35-43 infra for a discussion of the factors affecting the price an arbitrageur will pay for
target stock in a tender offer, factors which possess many similarities to those at work in a merger
situation.
25. See, e.g., ARANOW, EINHORN & BERLSTEIN vi (preface), xvii (introduction) (describing
the "torrent" of tender offers since 1972) (approximately 470 tender offers were registered with the
SEC between May 1, 1972, and May 1, 1977); Hayes & Taussig, Tactics of Cash Takeover Bids,
HARv. Bus. Rav., Mar.-Apr. 1967, at 135 (documenting statistically the rapid proliferation of cash
tender offers in the 1960s, id 136). See generally ARANOW & EINHORN 64-65, 65 n.3; Swanson,
S. 510 and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers: Distinguishing St. George from the Dragon, 5
HARV. J. LEGIS. 431, 432-33 (1968). This increase in tender offers gave rise to passage of the
Williams Act, but that Act in no way dampened the incidence of tender offers. On the contrary,
such offers have occurred with increasing frequency in the 1970s. See, e.g., Ehrbar, supra note 14,
at 83 (referring to "a flurry of 'unfriendly' takeovers that have been enriching arbitrageurs with
increasing frequency during the past year or so." The author goes on to explain that "the same
low stock prices that have held down the number of conventional mergers and acquisitions have
stimulated the unfriendly takeovers. Tender offers, many of which are takeover attempts, have
doubled since 1972 to a recent rate of around 100 a year."); Pavly, Wall Street's Tender Trap,
NEWSWEEK, Apr. 11, 1977, at 88 (commenting on tender offers in the mid-70s and observing that
"once again the tender offer is becoming a craze," id); Arbitrage: It's the Hottest Game in Town,
supra note 14, at 71 (in 1976 "risk arbitrage grew into what is probably the hottest game on Wall
Street. The risk arbitrageurs came up winners on scores of mergers and acquisitions").
26. Traditionally, securities arbitrage in the United States has been engaged in to a signifi-
cant degree exclusively by a select few Wall Street investment banking firms and arbitrage houses.
This is due in part to the degree of complexity involved in a successful arbitrage operation and
also in part to the large element of risk and the need for huge amounts of investment capital,
factors that discourage the amateur or dilettante investor. Also relevant is the fact that, in many
cases, arbitrage activities can be profitably undertaken only if the practitioner has a seat on the
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), a position that facilitates access to the market and yields
reduced commission costs. See notes 130-31, 136-37 infra and text accompanying notes 130-37
infra. See generally Ehrbar, supra note 14, at 83. ("professional arbitrageurs . . .are mostly
based in a few Wall Street firms-they include Salomon Brothers, Goldman Sachs, Bear Steams,
and L.F. Rothschild"); Rubin, Arbitrage, 32 Bus. LAW. 1315 (1977) ("There are about six or seven
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earn a handsome profit by exploiting the differential between market
price and tender price.
Tender offer arbitrage is at its simplest in a cash offer, in which
shareholders of a "target" corporation are requested by the "offeror"
corporation to tender their shares in return for cash. The arbitrageur
estimates his costs, figures in a factor for risk and the desired profit
margin, arrives at an estimate of what he can profitably afford to bid,27
and then enters the market quickly and quietly, buying large blocks of
target stock.
The effect of arbitrageur purchases is to drive up the price of target
stock on the market,28 thus narrowing the spread between market and
tender price. In the event that the spread becomes too narrow, threat-
ening the arbitrageur's profit margin, he will often back off temporarily
and liquidate a portion of his position in target stock in order to lower
the market price and then will resume purchasing.29 As the offer
draws to a close, the arbitrageur will pull out of the market, tender his
shares and collect his profit. In some cases, where market price is rela-
tively high and the arbitrageur has reason to fear that his tender will be
prorated,30 he will liquidate his position on the market and realize his
profits early. 1
major arbitrageurs new on the Street, and about fifteen firms involved to some extent. All of
them are members of the New York Stock Exchange. The large ones, with one exception, act
either wholly or primarily for their own account and the total number of people involved in this
activity is probably not more than 40." Id 1315); Arbitrage: It's the Hottest Game in Town,
supra note 14, at 71 (arbitrageurs are a "select group of Wall Street plungers" including such long-
time specialists as Goldman Sachs, Salomon Bros., Bache, and Sheriff Securities and such notable
newcomers as E.F. Hutton, Loeb Rhoades, Prescott, Ball & Turben, and Merrill Lynch); Wall
Street'r Highest Rollers, supra note 13, at 54-55 (principal practitioners of arbitrage are well-
known investment houses and "a few individual operators, like Ivan Boesky, a lawyer, accountant,
and security analyst." Id. The article characterizes Leonard Sheriff, of Sheriff Securities, as the
"dean of the business." Id. 55).
27. For a more detailed discussion of the factors weighed by arbitrageurs in arriving at a
purchase price, see notes 35-43 infra and accompanying text.
28. ARANOW & EINHORN 174. Extensive arbitrageur purchases, like any other large-scale
series of purchases of a company's stock, have the effect of raising the market price of that stock.
This price increase is compounded by the fact that arbitrageurs generally collect soliciting dealer's
fees for shares tendered and experience reduced commission expenses, thus allowing them profita-
bly to bid higher for stock than the average investor. See text accompanying notes 130-37 infra.
29. Henry 471.
30. In order to deal with the inequities engendered by offers which provided for acceptance
of only a specified number of shares on a first-come, first-served basis, see note 114 infra and
accompanying text, Congress provided in the Williams Act for a 10-day period of time during
which tenders made in excess of iny maximum contained in the offer must be accepted on a pro-
rata basis. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1976).
31. See Henry 471-72. It is to be emphasized that theprimary interest of the arbitrageur lies
in tendering his acquired position, especially where an exchange offer is involved and the arbi-
trageur needs to cover short sales of offeror stock. See text accompanying note 49 infra. How-
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In most cases, arbitrage pushes the market price toward, but not
above, the tender price.32 In some cases, however, the market price
actually moves above the tender price.33  It is not unusual, for exam-
ple, for arbitrageurs to consider a tender price to be unrealistically low.
In such an event, a bidding war often ensues between two or more of-
ferors attempting to gain control of the target corporation;34 arbi-
ever, there are some circumstances in which the arbitrageur may wish to sell into the market. One
such occasion, alluded to at text accompanying note 29 supra, arises where the arbitrageur sells
target stock to increase the spread between market and offer price. Another situation in which it
is profitable for the arbitrageur to sell occurs where the market price is near the offer price and it
becomes likely that the number of shares tendered will exceed the maximum amount acceptable
under the terms of the offer, indicating the probability of substantial proration of tenders. In this
event, the current market price for target shares might exceed the average price the arbitrageur
would receive if he tendered his shares and later sold any unaccepted shares on a falling market at
a loss. It would obviously be wise for the arbitrageur to sell in such a situation.
32. See note 28 supra. It stands to reason that the market price normally approaches the
tender price asymptotically. Insofar as the upward price movement is brought about in the first
place by the sudden emergence of an opportunity to realize a premium by tendering to the offeror,
it should not exceed the value of that opportunity. But see notes 33-34 infra and accompanying
text.
33. For example, in 1977 United Technologies Corp. made a $42 per share cash offer for the
stock of Babcock & Wilcox Co., a successful corporation operating in the areas of coal and nuclear
plant equipment. Soon thereafter, Babcock's stock traded upward from its preoffer price of
$34.75 per share to above $42 per share, reflecting the market's anticipation of a competing offer.
J. Ray McDermott, Inc. shortly thereafter made a competing offer, and there ensued a bidding
war which ultimately gave McDermott control of Babcock for $65 per share. See Tracy, supra
note 14, at 266-69; Bood in the water' at Babcock & Wilcox, Bus. WEEK, June 6, 1977, at 25-26;
Wall Street 'r Highest Rollers, supra note 13, at 54. To take another example, in 1976 H.K. Porter
Co. made a cash tender offer for the common stock of Fansteel, Inc. at $17 per share plus a $.45
soliciting dealer's fee. Trading in Fansteel, which had been at roughly $14 per share, was halted
and later reopened at approximately 18-1/2, above the offer price, and soon traded up to 19-1/4.
Soon thereafter, a competing offer was made at $22 plus a fee, to which Porter successfully re-
sponded with an offer of $23.50 plus a fee. See Rubin, supra note 26, at 1315-16. See generally
Ehrbar, supra note 14, at 84.
34. This was true, for example, in the recent battle between United Technologies Corp. and
J. Ray McDermott, Inc. for control of Babcock & Wilcox Co., and also in the 1976 Porter-Fansteel
takeover. See note 33 supra. Another recent situation where a cash tender offer met with compe-
tition was MCA's attempted takeover of Coca-Cola Bottling Company of Los Angeles (CCLA).
On October 10, 1977, the same day that rumors first began leaking to the public about MCA's
proposed offer, CCLA published a letter to its shareholders advising a "wait and see" approach.
MCA Will Offer $140 Million Cash to Buy a Bottler, Wall St. J., Oct. 10, 1977, at 5, col. 2 (discuss-
ing proposed MCA tender); Letter to Shareholders from Management of Coca-Cola of L.A., Wall
St. J., Oct. 10, 1977, at 19, col. 4. After the precise terms of the offer became known, CCLA
recommended that shareholders reject the proposed offer and filed suit against MCA seeking to
enjoin the offer. Letter to Shareholders from Management of Coca-Cola of L.A., Wall St. J., Oct.
12, 1977, at 34, col. 4; Bottler of Coke in LosAngeles Fights MCA Bid, Wall St. J., Oct. 12, 1977, at
19, col 1 (detailing CCLA's suit against MCA). MCA responded by publishing a formal offer at
$30 per share for common stock and $58.50 per share for preferred stock and by filing a counter-
suit against CCLA. Offer to Purchase for Cash Any and All Outstanding Shares of Common
Stock at $30.00 Per Share Net and $2 Cumulative Convertible Preferred Stock, Series A at $58.50
Per Share Net of Coca-Cola Bottling Company of Los Angeles, Wall St. J., Oct. 13, 1977, at 29-32.
Before substantial litigation had occurred, Northwest Industries stepped in as a "friendly" third
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trageurs, anticipating competing tender offers at higher prices, will then
push market prices above the original tender price.
D. The Risks of Tender Offer Arbitrage.
Arbitrageurs accept risks arising from possible legal impediments
to the offer, external economic influences that may upset the offer,35
risks arising from the terms and conditions of the offer itself,36 and risks
traceable to the make-up of the target constituency. Possible legal im-
pediments to the success of a tender offer include the need for approval
by a federal or state regulatory agency,37 the possible effect of state
anti-takeover statutes,38 potential antitrust problems39 and the likeli-
party and made a competing cash offer which ultimately proved successful. Notice of Offer to
Purchase for Cash Common Stock at $40 Per Share and Preferred Stock at $78 Per Share of Coca-
Cola Bottling Company of Los Angeles by NIW, Inc. a Wholly-Owned Subsidiary of Northwest
Industries, Inc., Wall St. J., Oct. 19, 1977, at 34, col. 4.
35. These external economic influences may include, for example, general changes in the
economy or governmental money policy, changes in the business or capitalization of either the
offeror or the target, or recent adverse earnings reports.
36. Obviously, the terms and conditions of the offer have a great deal to do with its success or
failure. Aside from basic price considerations, the arbitrageur must ascertain, for example,
whether a minimum tender is required and, if so, whether it is likely to be met. He must also
consider the likelihood of proration, whether or not soliciting dealer's fees are available, see note
131 infra and text accompanying notes 131-33 infra, and other similar factors which impact upon
the offer's attractiveness.
37. ARANOW & EINHORN 184. Such a situation is likely to occur where the target is a public
utility, common carrier, insurance company, a corporation engaged in the broadcast media, or
other similar regulated entity.
38. Many states have enacted anti-takeover statutes in recent years in response to the growing
trend of unfriendly tender offers. Such statutes typically impose restrictions and disclosure re-
quirements similar in many respects to the requirements of the Williams Act. However, the state
laws tend to be stricter and to impose greater time delays and in many respects are perhaps aimed
more at discouraging than at regulating tender offers. See generally ARANOW, EINHORN & BEa.-
STEIN 207-57; Langevoort, State Tender-Offer Legislatiorn Interests, Effects, and Political
Competency, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 213 (1977); Shipman, Some Thoughts About the Role of State
Takeover Legslation" The Ohio Takeover Act, 21 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 722 (1970); Wilner &
Landy, The Tender Trap: State Takeover Statutes and Their Constitutionality, 45 FoRDHAM L.
R v. 1 (1976). There is serious doubt as to the constitutionality of many of these statutes, and a
good argument exists that they are preempted both by the Williams Act and as an undue burden
on interstate commerce. See ARANOW, EINIHORN & BERLSTEiN 225-33. Indeed, the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently so held, affirming a lower court's invalidation of Idaho's
anti-takeover statute on both of the above grounds. Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577
F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978), aJ'g 439 F. Supp. 420 (N.D. Tex. 1977). For the general background
of this lawsuit at the district court level, see Takeover Law in Idaho Ruled Unconstitutional, Wall
St. J., Sept. 6, 1977, at 4, col. 1.
39. A.ANow & EINHORN 184. See generally ARANOW, EINHORN & BERLSTEIN 147-60.
Typically, a hostile target management will bring a lawsuit alleging antitrust violations whenever
there exists the barest colorable basis for such allegations. It is not essential that target manage-
ment actually win the case-it is enough that they cause sufficient delay to defeat the offer. See
Henry 468. Note, however, the possible breach of fiduciary duty to target shareholders where
there is interposed a purely frivolous lawsuit, a subject which is beyond the scope of this Coin-
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hood that effective defense tactics will be employed by target manage-
ment. The arbitrageur must evaluate the merits of litigation instituted
by the target management; moreover, even if the target group is ulti-
mately unsuccessful on the merits, delay alone may be sufficient to de-
feat the offer.'
An arbitrageur also must ascertain the number and type of share-
holders in the target constituency, their relative holdings and the nor-
mal volume of trading in the stock.41  The possibility of shareholder
loyalty42 to target management must be considered, and estimates must
be made of the number of shares held by "friends" of target manage-
ment, who may have agreed not to tender. An arbitrageur prefers a
corporation in which large blocks of stock reside with institutional in-
vestors, since institutional shareholders are the most likely to cash in to
avoid the risks of the offer.
43
ment. A recent example of a situation where an antitrust suit succeeded in defeating a tender
offer is presented by Anderson, Clayton & Co.'s attempted takeover of Gerber. There, Gerber
responded with an antitrust suit, which it succeeded in having split for separate, consecutive trials
on two issues, a procedural device which would have insured years of delay. Not surprisingly,
Anderson, Clayton withdrew its offer. See Bid byAnderson Clayton to Buy Gerber Dropped, Wall
St. J., Sept. 20, 1977, at 48, coL 1.
40. See note 39 supra.
41. The arbitrageur normally attempts to isolate target stock according to the class of share-
holder by which it is held, ie., target insiders, institutional investors, the offeror, other arbi-
trageurs and the public. He then evaluates the likelihood of tenders from each class. ARANOW &
EINHORN 187; Wyser-Pratte 58-59.
42. Although some commentators argue that there is no such creature as a "loyal share-
holder," see, e.g., O'Boyle, Changing Tactics in Tender Offers, 25 Bus. LAW. 863, 866 (1970), at
least some shareholders may be so characterized. Three potential classes of "loyal shareholders"
come to mind. First, management personnel and other employees of the target corporation often
own significant amounts of target stock, frequently pursuant to employee stock purchase plans.
The probable affinity of such shareholders for incumbent management is obvious. Second, there
are often many small "Mom and Pop"-type shareholders who have held their shares for many
years and are pleased with the policies of incumbent management. Such shareholders are the
most likely candidates to be swayed by management's exhortations that the offeror is nothing
more than a "corporate pirate" or "raider" intent on looting the target corporation and may well
choose not to tender even when tendering would be in their financial best interest. This is espe-
cially true where the target corporation is an established local or regional operation and the of-
feror is viewed as an "outsider." A third type of "loyal shareholder" is the large investor,
typically an institution, whose investment in the target goes well beyond common stock and may
include substantial holdings of preferred stock, bonds, debentures and other substantial long-term
financing commitments. Often such an investor will be represented on the target's board of direc-
tors. Presumably, where such an investor enjoys a cozy and mutually beneficial relationship with
incumbent management, it will be unwilling to upset the applecart by tendering. However, the
other side of the coin is that such a shareholder may be forced to tender or sell on the market in
order to avoid charges that it has breached a fiduciary duty to its own shareholders to obtain the
premium proffered by the offeror. See notes 43, 119 infra and accompanying text.
43. The institutional investor who merely holds blocks of the target's common stock as a
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Finally, the arbitrageur must consider a number of additional fac-
tors-the possibility of proration; the costs of capital, specialist fees and
transfer taxes; the availability of soliciting dealer's fees; and his own
desired profit margin-to arrive in the end at the price he is willing to
pay for tendered shares.
In the case of exchange offers, this process becomes even more
complex. Arbitrageurs tend to view exchange offers as more risky un-
dertakings than tender offers" for a variety of reasons, including the
need for registration of the offeror's new issue of securities, increased
SEC scrutiny 45 and the possible need for approval by the offeror (is-
suer) shareholders.4" These requirements usually lengthen the period
of the offer and totally eliminate the element of surprise, thus providing
target management with more time to react and to engage in defensive
tactics.47 In addition, many target shareholders do not wish to become
investors in the offeror corporation or may be confused as to parity
where a complicated package is offered. Thus, where they would ar-
guably accept a cash offer, some might react negatively to an exchange
offer.48
The mechanics of exchange offer arbitrage are slightly more com-
plicated than those of a cash offer. The arbitrageur figures parity, risk,
costs, profit and price as in the case of a cash offer. However, he must
also sell short the securities offered in the deal. He then exchanges his
liquid investment is unlikely to have any particular loyalties and is simply out to get maximum
earnings on its investment. At the same time, such an investor is under fiduciary obligations to its
own shareholders and, thus, would prefer to steer clear of risky undertakings which might engen-
der shareholder discontent and result in litigation. The option of selling onto the market at a
premium, with no risk whatsoever, is particularly appealing to such an investor. The institutional
investor may also prefer to sell on the market rather than tender for tax reasons discussed at note
119 infra. In some cases, however, a conflict is created for the institutional investor whose invest-
ment in the target is substantial, extending beyond mere ownership of common stock and who
therefore would prefer not to sell but nevertheless feels pressured to do so. See note 42 supra.
For a more thorough discussion of the role of the institutional investor in the tender offer process,
see note 119 infra and text accompanying notes 117-19 infra.
44. One commentator notes that, although arbitrageurs exhibit a notable preference for cash
offers, exchange offers would appear to have better chances of success. Henry 469 n.20. A study
of tender offers from 1956 to 1967 found that exchange offers were twice as likely to succeed as
were cash offers. See Austin & Fishman, The Tender Take Over, MERGERS & AcQuISITIONS,
May-June 1969, at 13-14.
45. Henry 469.
46. For example, shareholder approval is required if the offeror needs to authorize the issu-
ance of new shares with which to consummate the exchange transaction.
47. Henry 469.
48. This can work both ways, however. Since the arbitrageur is offering cash on the market
for the target company's stock, he often aids in placing the offeror's issue by creating a cash alter-
native for those who would not otherwise tender. See notes 60-61 infra and accompanying text.
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acquired position in target stock and covers his short position in offeror
stock. In the event the offer fails, the arbitrageur faces the added risk
that, in addition to having to dump target shares in the market, he may
also have trouble covering his short position in offeror stock on the
-market without driving the price up and incurring additional losses. 9
A final consideration distinguishing exchange offer arbitrage from
the cash offer variety focuses upon the care an exchange offer arbi-
trageur must exercise not to run afoul of section 5(a) of the 1933 Securi-
ties Act,50 which prohibits the sale of new issues of securities prior to
the effective date of their registration statement."' It is perfectly legiti-
mate for the arbitrageur to begin selling short the offeror's securities
prior to the effective date of the registration statement so long as there
are existing registered securities of the same class outstanding; how-
ever, he violates section 5(a) if he later covers his short position with
securities received in the exchange, which are of the new issue, since he
is then "selling" the new securities prior to the effective date of the
registration statement. 2 To surmount this obstacle the arbitrageur
must act quickly to cover his short position as soon as the registration
statement becomes effective, and presumably before the new shares
have hit the market, thus covering with "old" shares. The arbitrageur
then almost immediately reestablishes his short position in offeror
stock, remaining at the mercy of the market for only a brief period of
time. When this new short position is covered with" "new" securities,
no problem arises since it was acquired after registration had become
effective. 3
49. ARANOW & EINHORN 180-81.
50. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (1976).
51. Id This is the so-called "gun-jumping" provision of the 1933 Act. Section 5(a) specifi-
cally prohibits the "direct or indirect" sale or carriage for the purpose of sale of an unregistered
security where there is "use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in
interstate commerce or of the mails."
52. Henry 474-75. Note, however, that since Henry's article appeared, the SEC has created a
limited exception to this general rule by agreeing not to recommend enforcement actions for viola-
tion of section 5(a) where the arbitrageur meets certain specified conditions. See No-Action Let-
ters from SEC to Messrs. Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, dated Jan. 12, 1973 (available Feb.
11, 1973), and Feb. 16, 1973 (available Mar. 18, 1973) (collectively referred to by the SEC in later
no-action letters as the "arbitrage letters"). Observe, however, that the conditions for exemption
of arbitrageurs are rather strict and include provisions to the effect that the arbitrageur will not
acquire more than 10 percent of the securities covered by the exchange offer registration statement
and that he will not sign a soliciting dealer's agreement or collect any soliciting dealer's fees. This
latter requirement is particularly troublesome to the arbitrageur, insofar as most offers do in fact
provide for a soliciting dealer's fee, and in many cases the arbitrageur would not make a profit
without the fee. See notes 131, 137 infra and text accompanying notes 131-33.
53. Henry 474-75.
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II. TRADITIONALLY ADVANCED JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE
NONREGULATION OF TENDER OFFER ARBITRAGE
The existence of an outstanding tender offer creates a variety of
pressures upon target shareholders. They must weigh the merits of the
offer, its chances for success, the value of their holdings as a continuing
investment, the price a sale would bring on the market and other like
considerations. Such an undertaking often calls for a degree of
financial acumen beyond that possessed by the average unsophisticated
investor.
It is a commonly held view that since arbitrageurs are better able
to assess these risks and contingencies than is the average shareholder,
and are willing to shoulder the risks in return for the possibility of a
large profit, they should be freely permitted to do so.54 The arbi-
trageur provides the investor with a riskless alternative to tendering or
holding onto his shares, giving the shareholder the option of selling his
stock at a gain on the market and reinvesting his money elsewhere.
From that point onward, the arbitrageur assumes the risk of litigation,
delay, failure of the offer, proration and the like.55
The existence of an option to sell on the market into the hands of
arbitrageurs protects target shareholders against proration in the event
more shares are tendered than will be accepted under the terms of the
offer. Were the target shareholders forced to unload these unaccepted
shares on a falling market, they would most likely suffer substantial
losses.56 The arbitrageur is in a better position to minimize these losses
by virtue of his ability to enter the market quickly and on better terms
than the average investor.57
The target shareholder is also protected against the possibility that,
should he retain his stock, it will ultimately be delisted or absorbed by
some form of minority shareholder "freeze-out" such as a short-form
merger.5" By creating a market for target stock, the arbitrageur gives
54. See, e.g., ARANOW & EINHORN 174; Henry 483.
55. These risks are, of course, reflected in the price the arbitrageur is willing to pay for target
stock. See notes 35-43 supra and accompanying text.
56. The market for target shares normally falls substantially following a tender offer, due in
large part to "dumping" of unaccepted shares on the market. For example, in the Anderson,
Clayton-Gerber offer discussed at note 39 supra, Gerber was selling at $33 per share prior to
Anderson, Clayton's $40 offer. Gerber's price quickly rose to more than $39 following announce-
ment of the offer. When the offer fell through, so did the price--to levels below $28 per share.
57. Because the arbitrageur normally is a NYSE member, he possesses a double advantage
over the average investor first, he can get to the floor of the exchange more quickly to unload his
shares and, second, he avoids all but floor brokerage expenses. See note 130 infra and accompa-
nying text.
58. Many states have corporate law provisions which allow a corporation with large holdings
in a subsidiary (e.g., 90% or greater) to undertake a "short-form" merger of the subsidiary into the
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target shareholders the opportunity to avoid the risks of being left hold-
ing stock whose value is down on the market, and which may shortly
become unmarketable and lose its character as a liquid investment.
Even sophisticated investors are arguably benefitted by arbitrageur
participation in a tender offer. Insofar as their sophistication equips
them with an awareness of the normal signs of arbitrageur activity,
such knowledge serves as a signal to them of the consensus among the
arbitrage community as to whether or not the offer will succeed, and
hence is an aid in their own decision-making process.5 9
Where an exchange offer is involved, the arbitrageur makes a mar-
ket for the target stock and thus insures a cash alternative for target
shareholders who do not wish to own stock in the offeror corporation.60
Exchange offer arbitrage further helps to insure the success of the offer
by, in effect, placing the issue of the offeror in the hands of those who
purchase when the arbitrageur sells short.6" This arguably is of critical
parent, without the need for approval of other minority shareholders in the subsidiary. See, e.g.,
DEL CODE tit. 8, § 253 (1974). Although many such jurisdictions also provide rights of dissent
and appraisal for discontented minority shareholders, see, e.g., DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 262 (1974), it is
questionable whether such rights are really meaningful, since the shareholder generally does not
get a price any better than that which he could have obtained on the market, and in addition he
must wait longer to receive that price and often incurs litigation expenses. See generally Man-
ning, The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy: An Essayfor Frank Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223 (1962).
Thus, if an offeror acquires large holdings in the target (which thus becomes a subsidiary of the
offeror), the minority shareholder faces the possibility of holding unmarketable stock worth
significantly less than before the takeover. For a general discussion of the problems associated
with minority shareholder "freeze-outs" and related "going private" transactions, see J. FLOM, M.
LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS AND TAKEOUTS-TENDER OFFERS AND GOING PRIVATE
(1976).
59. See Henry 470.
60. In many cases, the target shareholders have no interest in receiving the offeror's securi-
ties. This may simply be a consequence of the fact that they feel the offeror corporation is not a
good investment. There may also be a reluctance to tender on the part of target shareholders
where the package put forth by the offeror would replace equity securities with debt instruments.
See O'Boyle, supra note 42, at 865; Rubin, supra note 26, at 1317. In these situations arbitrage
creates a demand for target shares and insures a cash alternative to the receipt of offeror securities.
61. An interesting peripheral question is who buys the offeror securities when the arbitrageur
sells them short. One plausible answer was proposed by O'Boyle, who postulates what might be
described as a "second lever' of arbitrage. See O'Boyle, supra note 42, at 867-68. The theory,
briefly stated, is that "friends" of the offeror manage to get wind of the proposed exchange offer
early. Since the price of an offeror's stock usually rises slightly just prior to the offer's formal
announcement, based on rumors which inevitably leak out concerning the offer, these "friends"
will take advantage of the public leaks by having earlier accumulated a position in offeror stock
which they proceed to sell, as well as assuming a short position in offeror stock, immediately prior
to announcement of the offer. The price of offeror stock will then typically fall after the offer is
announced. It is at this point that arbitrageurs are selling short offeror stock, and O'Boyle theo-
rizes that the "friends" purchase this stock from the aribtrageurs in order to cover their own pre-
existing short positions, thus consummating the "second level" of arbitrage. Id
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importance to many exchange offers, which might otherwise fail for
lack of target shareholders willing to accept offeror stock.
One interpretation of the above observations is that arbitrage helps
to facilitate the smooth operation of the tender offer process by creating
markets for target and offeror stock and helps to insure the orderly
transition of market prices by gradually eliminating the spread between
market and tender price.62 Some commentators argue that this process
would occur even in the absence of arbitrage, but that arbitrage helps it
to happen in a faster, smoother, more efficient manner.63
Finally, proponents of arbitrage argue that the activities of arbi-
trageurs are in accord with what is assumed to be the basic policy of the
federal securities laws-investor protection. According to this view,
target shareholders can never be hurt by arbitrage because they are
under no compulsion to sell; if they do choose to sell, they are actually
helped because they are given a cash alternative to the tender process at
a price in excess of what they would receive on the market in the ab-
sence of arbitrage.
If these views are accepted, arbitrage must be considered a healthy
force in the marketplace and ought to be allowed to flourish unabated.
This characterization of arbitrage is consonant with the maxim that in a
free enterprise system those who bear the risks deserve to reap the re-
wards. Under this view the ever-present risk of failure is sufficient to
keep arbitrage in check. As aptly stated by one observer:
An arbitrageur is one who ... stands between the two parties in
transactions involving equivalents and guesses how the opinions that
each man has of what the other man wants will vary. If he guesses
right, he can make a great deal of money. If he guesses wrong, he
doesn't stay in the arbitrage business very long ....
III. THE CASE FOR REGULATION OF TENDER OFFER ARBITRAGE
The preceding analysis, while superficially appealing, nevertheless
fails to deal adequately with the real problem brought about by tender
offer arbitrage-an imbalance of existing tender offer regulation giving
rise to the potential for long-term damage to the economy. It may well
62. See generally Henry 471-74, 483; see also EVANS 63-74 (discussing in general the
problems of supply and demand associated with various types of risk arbitrage).
63. See, e.g., Rubin, supra note 26, at 1316-17. Arguably, however, what happens with the
help of arbitrage would not always inevitably occur absent its influence, insofar as the mere pres-
ence of arbitrage in many cases affects the chances for success of the offer. This observation is
central to the argument developed in Part III of this Comment infra and is examined at length
therein.




be that actions taken thus far to regulate the target and offeror are
largely ineffectual in achieving a fair balance in the absence of regula-
tion of the third essential party in the tender offer process-the arbi-
trageur. Arguably, Congress has thus far addressed only the tip of the
iceberg.
Under normal circumstances, the securities market is "efficient,"
that is, it reflects all available information in stock prices, so that no
individual investor can enjoy disproportionate gains over any sustained
period of time by virtue of his knowledge or position .6  The an-
nouncement of a tender offer complicates the process, but the market
should nonetheless continue to behave efficiently, absent the interfer-
ence of arbitrage.6 6 Arbitrageurs, however, are able to short-circuit the
process and to sustain profits beyond the reach of the general investing
public.
The consequences of this departure from efficiency are significant.
The delicate balance of tender offer regulation is shifted in favor of the
offeror because of the tremendous pressure exerted upon investors to
sell target stock which will ultimately end up in the hands of arbi-
trageurs 7 The phenomenon is accelerated as more and more stock
falls into the hands of arbitrageurs, decreasing the risk that the offer
will fail and, hence, increasing pressure on investors to sell by permit-
ting arbitrageurs to raise the price they are willing to pay.
The beneficiaries of this phenomenon are the target shardholders
and the arbitrageurs, both of whom receive windfall profits. These
windfalls are not justified by the goals of investor protection.68 Arbi-
trageurs cannot rightfully seek refuge in the concept of free enterprise
since they violate one of its first premises-that investors have access to
the market on equal terms. 69 Arbitrageurs exploit a near-monopolistic
position, upsetting the market's ideal balance. To better understand
what that ideal should be, it is necessary to discuss in some detail the
economic theory that best explains market behavior and upon which
market regulation should be grounded.
65. The theory of efficient capital markets is discussed at text accompanying notes 71-104
infra.
66. See text accompanying note 105 infra.
67. The effects of market inefficiency upon the balance of tender offer regulation, and upon
the economy as a whole, are discussed at sections C and D of this Comment. See text accompa-
nying notes 110-26 infra.
68. See text accompanying notes 127-29 infra.
69. See notes 130-31, 136-37 infra and text accompanying notes 130-37 infra for a detailed
discussion of the special advantages arbitrageurs have vis-h-vis the ordinary investor.
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A. The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis-A Theoretical
Digression. 70
The term Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis (ECMH) denotes
the most recent advance in a line of theoretical and empirical economic
research that has achieved growing acceptance in the past two decades.
The ECMH theory had its origin in the observation that successive
price movements of individual stocks or groups of stocks are appar-
ently patternless in character.71 Application of mathematical and sta-
tistical aids to historical market information confirmed the absence of a
pattern in stock price changes and prompted the conclusion that such
changes are essentially "random. '72  This came to be known as the
"random walk" theory of stock prices.73
Subsequent attempts to explain theoretically the observed ran-
domness of stock price changes led to the development of the ECMH.
Simply stated, the ECMH postulates that stock markets are "effi-
cient"--that they fully reflect all available information through effi-
cient information processing and that any future price movement will
be the result of entirely "new" information. According to the ECMH,
this new information, by definition incapable of advance prediction,
will have a random impact upon changes in stock prices.74
The ECMH is naturally controversial in the investment commu-
nity because it implies that under efficient market conditions no inves-
tor using only information generally available to other investors can
70. The author wishes to acknowledge at the outset that the organization of the following
section of this Comment is based upon Stanford Note and Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A
Review of the Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FINANCE 383 (1970), both of which provide an
excellent overview of the theory and research comprising the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis.
71. The earliest documentation of randomness in security price changes was based upon ob-
servations of price patterns in the French commodities market. See L. BACHELIER, THEORIE DE
LA SPECULATION (1900), translated into English in THE RANDOM CHARACTER OF STOCK MARKET
PRICES 17 (P. Cootner ed., rev. ed. 1964). It was not until 1959, however, that modem work
began to appear which utilized mathematical and statistical methodology aimed at proving stock
price change randomness. See Osborne, Brownian Motion in the Stock Market, 7 OPERATIONS
RESEARCH 145 (1959); Roberts, Stock-Market "Patterns" and Financial Analysis: Methodological
Suggestions, 14 J. FINANCE 1 (1959). This work, and its theoretical significance, is discussed in
more detail at notes 85-87 infra and accompanying text and in authorities cited therein.
72. See note 71 supra, notes 85-87 infra and accompanying text. See generally LORIE &
HAMILTON 71-82; Stanford Note 1040-44.
73. The term "random walk" has been a part of the statistician's vocabulary for over seventy
years and was, as far as can be determined, first coined in an exchange of correspondence between
Karl Pearson and the Right Honorable Lord Rayleigh appearing in NATURE in 1905. 72 NATURE
294, 318, 342 (1905). See LoRE & HAMILTON 71. The term originated as descriptive of the path
taken by a disoriented person left to wander aimlessly in an open space. It has since proven
adaptable to data depicting stock price movements.
74. See generally LORIE & HAMILTON 79-82, 97; Stanford Note 1035-41.
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systematically identify securities that are undervalued or overvalued,75
ostensibly rendering research into stock pricing models futile. To sup-
port the ECMH, three factors implicit in the theory must be empirically
verified: "the determinants of security values, the processes of security
price formation and the characteristics of prices that 'fully reflect' avail-
able information."76 To this end, theorists have attempted first to iso-
late the variables which investors weigh, consciously or unconsciously,
in determining the price they are willing to pay for a security and, sec-
ond, to formulate mathematical models or equations which accurately
portray the interrelationship of these variables as they interact to deter-
mine security prices. By resorting to such models, theorists may verify
the validity of the ECMH by comparing the expected behavior of the
market under the ECMH with actual observed behavior.
To develop a theory of security valuation, certain basic assump-
tions must be made about investor behavior. The common approach of
economists is to assume that investors want to make as much money as
possible with as little risk as possible. Thus, the value of a security is a
function of its "expected returns, '77 discounted by a factor for "risk"78
which represents the degree of uncertainty in the determination of ex-
pected returns. These assumptions have led to the development of
75. Stanford Note 1035. A security is "undervalued" when available information would
indicate that the security should be selling at a higher price. Similarly, a security is "overvalued"
when available information dictates a lower price for the security than that which prevails in the
market. The "intrinsic" value of a security is the theoretical value that the security would have if
all information which could be known about it were reflected in its price. In an efficient market,
it is possible for there to exist stocks priced other than at "intrinsic" value. The catch, however, is
that no investor is able to ldentf4y such stocks. Stated alternatively, there is no stock that is over-
valued or undervalued in the sense that there is available information about the stock that would
indicate a price other than that which prevails; the existence of information not already reflected
in the stock's price would contradict the premise of market efficiency that stock prices reflect all
available information. Id n.23.
76. Stanford Note 1036, see Fama, supra note 70, at 384. See also B. LEv, FINANCIAL
STATEMENT ANALYsIs: A NEW APPROACH 217-18 (1974).
77. It is a basic economic principle that the value of an asset lies in the income it can produce
for its owner. Stated in financial terms, the value of an asset is the present value of future cash
flows that it can provide to its owner. These cash flows derive from two sources: first, periodic
payments with respect to the asset such as dividends and interest and, second, the price realized
upon disposition of the asset. See, e.g., LORIE & HAMILTON 113-14.
The "expected returns" or "expected value" of an investment asset is a weighted value that
attempts to account for all contingencies and to ascertain a statistically "most likely" value. It
represents "the sum, over all possible events, of the probability of an event times its value" should
it occur. Stanford Note 1036 n.25.
78. "Risk" is nothing more than uncertainty as to the outcome of future events. It is a basic
principle of economics, as well as common sense, that investors seek to avoid risk and will demand
greater returns on their capital as risk increases. For general discussions of investor behavior with
regard to incurring risk see, e.g., Friedman & Savage, The Expected- Utility Hypothesis and the
Measurability of Utility, 60 J. POL. ECON. 463 (1952); Tobin, Liquidity Preference as Behavior
Towards Rirk, 25 REv. ECON. STUD. 65 (1958).
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portfolio theory, 9 which, in combination with other economic theory,80
seeks to explain price determination in capital markets.
When these price determination theories are assumed to apply in
an efficient market, it follows that all available information is a factor
in determining expected returns and risk, and, hence, all available in-
79. Portfolio theory was developed by economists as an attempt to explain the behavior of
rational investors in choosing investments. Since a detailed discussion of portfolio theory is be-
yond the scope of this Comment, this author win briefly track the conclusions that have been
reached by theorists insofar as they are relevant to the present inquiry and will cite the reader
elsewhere for detailed exposition. For a good general and nontechnical discussion of the subject
see LORIE & HAMILTON.
Before developing any theory of investor behavior, theorists had to arrive at a statistical
measure for risk. The measure most often chosen has been the standard deviation, which in this
case is used to measure variation in the probability distribution of expected returns on a security.
A large standard deviation corresponds to higher risk and hence causes investors to demand
greater returns. See H. MARKowrrz, PORTFOLIO SELECTION: EFFICIENT DIVERSIFICATION OF
INVESTMENTS (1959); Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FINANCE 77 (1952). The corollary of
this proposition is that, among assets having the same expected returns, investors prefer those with
smaller standard deviations and, among assets with the same standard deviations, investors seek
the greatest expected returns. See, e.g., W. SHARP, PORTFOLIO THEORY AND CAPITAL MARKETS
26-27 (1970).
Portfolio theory has demonstrated that the risks inherent in holding any particular stock can
be greatly reduced through a process known as "diversification," whereby the investor scientifi-
cally acquires stock in a variety of enterprises, in effect approximating the behavior of the market
as a whole. See H. MARmowrrZ, supra. It is mathematically possible to determine the precise
behavior of a portfolio of securities based upon the interrelationship, or correlation, of each pair
of securities within the portfolio. W. SHARPE, supra, at 117-19. Such a computation is normally
complex and impractical (even for a computer); therefore, most stock analysts use simplified mod-
els, based upon the relationship of each individual stock to a common index, such as the Dow
Jones Average. Id 119-40. It can be mathematically demonstrated that, through proper
diversification, variability related only to the specific securities chosen can be eliminated. See, e.g.,
E. FAMA & M. MILLER, THE THEORY OF FINANCE 253-55 (1972).
80. The results of portfolio theory have been used to develop a model that explains how
capital asset prices are determined. This model has come to be known as the Capital Asset Pric-
ing Model (CAPM). See Lintner, The Valuation of Rosk Assets and the Selection of Jisky Invest-
ments in Stock Portfolios and Capital Budgets, 47 REV. ECON. & STATISTICS 13 (1965); Sharpe,
Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Capital Market Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk, 19 J. Fi-
NANCE 425 (1964).
Nearly all empirical tests of the ECMH, see text accompanying notes 84-101 infra, have used
some form of expected return analysis as a starting point. The CAPM has been especially useful in
this regard. Thus, although the ECMH itself is independent of the validity of the CAPM, many of
the empirical tests of the ECMH do depend on this model's reliability. Research to date indicates
that the CAPM is reasonably accurate. See, e.g., Douglas, Risk in the Equity Markets:An Empiri-
calAppraisalofMarket Efficiency, 9 YALE ECON. ESSAYS 3 (1969); Fama & MacBeth, Risk, Return
and Equilibrium Empirical Tests, 81 J. POL. ECON. 607 (1973); Miller & Scholes, Rates of Return
and Relation to Risk, A Re-examination of Some Recent Findings, in STUDIES IN THE THEORY OF
CAPITAL MARKETS (M. Jensen ed. 1972); cf Blume & Friend, A New Look at the CapitalAsset
Pricing Model, 28 J. FINANCE 19 (1973) (suggesting inconsistencies in the model's results). Even
if the CAPM were found to be deficient, the ECMH would not necessarily be refuted, for such a
finding could mean only that standard deviation is an inadequate measure of risk or that investors
employ criteria in addition to expected returns when assessing available information regarding an
investment asset. Stanford Note 1038 n.30.
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formation is reflected in stock prices.81 Under such a theory, no inves-
tor can systematically identify mispriced stock.82  As a corollary
proposition, securities prices are such that the expected rate of return is
equal for all securities having the same degree of risk.83
Research supporting the validity of the ECMH is of three basic
varieties, corresponding to the types of information under considera-
tion.84  The "weak form" verification of the ECMH tests whether in-
formation about past price changes is reflected in current prices. The
"semistrong form" measures the rapidity with which stock prices adjust
to currently available information. The "strong form" applies semi-
strong tests to measure market adjustment to nonpublic information.
The weak form of the ECMH asserts that all information which
can be derived from past price changes is incorporated into present se-
curity prices. Attempts to test this assertion have adopted two different
approaches. One line of inquiry examines actual sequences of security
price movements for statistical properties indicating randomness.8S
The other approach involves an attempt to disprove the weak form hy-
81. The theory of the Capital Asset Pricing Model can be used to derive equations that, when
taken together, mathematically demonstrate the impossibility, except by pure chance, of an inves.
tor's generating above average returns, assuming that securities are priced according to expected
returns. Stanford Note 1038-39 n.31. See E. FAmA & M. MILLER, supra note 79, at 335-38.
82. Stanford Note 1038-39. See note 75 supra and accompanying text.
83. Stanford Note 1039. See note 79 supra.
84. See LoRm & HAMILTON 71; Stanford Note 1041.
85. As indicated at note 71 supra, observers noted the apparent randomness of securities
price movements as early as 1900. It was not until the late 1950s and the 1960s, however, that
such observations were subjected to exacting mathematical and statistical analysis. For example,
Roberts indicated in a 1959 study that series of numbers created by cumulating random numbers
displayed the same visual appearance as a time series of stock prices. Roberts, supra note 71, at
4-6. Osborne, a well-known physicist, undertook a unique study of security price changes which
compared such changes to the movement of small particles suspended in solution-known as
"Brownian motion"--and observed a high degree of correlation between price movements and the
laws of physics governing Brownian motion. Osborne, supra note 71, at 145.
There followed in the 1960s a series of tests, utilizing various statistical methods of analyzing
time series of stock prices, which uniformly were able to discover, at most, insignificant departures
from randomness, thus lending strong support to the weak-form ECMH. See, e.g., Fama, 7he
Behavior of Stock Market Prices, 38 J. Bus. 34 (1965); Granger & Morgenstern, SpectralAnalysis
of New York Stock Market Prices, 16 KYKLOS 1(1963); Moore, Some Characteristics of Changes
in Common Stock Prices in THE RANDOM CHARACTER OF STOCK MARKET PRICES 139-61 (P.
Cootner ed. 1964).
In 1965, Professor Samuelson first published a rigorous mathematical proof that prices neces-
sarily move randomly in an efficient market. Samuelson, Proof that Properly Anticipated Prices
Fluctuate Randomly, 6 INDUS. MANAGEMENT REv., Spring 1965, at 41. Implicit but unstated in
Samuelson's proof are the following conditions for market efficiency: (1) absence of transaction
costs to investors; (2) absence of information costs to investors; and (3) homogeneous expectations
among investors regarding the returns on securities when given equal access to information. See
Stanford Note 1040 n.38. However, it is not always necessary for these "ideal" conditions to exist
for the market to approximate efficiency. See text accompanying note 103 infra.
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pothesis by devising profitable trading schemes based upon past pat-
terns of price movements.8 6 Both methods of testing the weak form
hypothesis have produced consistent and convincing empirical evi-
dence that present price movements are unaffected by information de-
rived from past trends.87
The semistrong form of the ECMH asserts that prices react rapidly
and without bias to information as it is made publicly available. Em-
pirical tests of this hypothesis have focused upon measuring the speed
of adjustment and upon determining the type of information to which
prices react.88  Tests designed to measure speed of adjustment most
often compare the performance of a particular security with that of the
market as a whole during the particular period of time encompassing
the public release of information pertaining to the security.89 Re-
searchers look for significant deviations of the security's price from its
"normal" relationship with other market prices as indications of adjust-
ment to the new information.' Tests of this nature have been applied
to the public announcement of stock splits, annual earnings reports and
secondary offerings of common stock, as well as to a variety of other
types of information made public by filing with the SEC, publication
by the financial press or other similar means.91 In virtually every case,
"the empirical evidence indicates that security prices react extremely
rapidly." 92 Often, such adjustment begins to occur well before the for-
86. See Alexander, Price Movements in Speculative Markets.- Trends or Random Walks, 2
INDUS. MANAGEMENT REv., May 1961, at 7; Alexander, Price Movements in Speculative Markets:
Trends or Random Walks, No. 2, 5 INDUS. MANAGEMENT REv., Spring 1964, at 25. Although
Alexander's first efforts to disprove the weak-form ECMH by devising profitable trading schemes
appeared to be successful, it has since been shown that, in practice, transaction costs (which Alex-
ander ignored) and other related market imperfections consume any minor advantage that might
otherwise adhere in such trading schemes. See Fama, supra note 85; Fama & Blume, Filter Rules
and Stock Market Trading, 39 J. Bus. 226 (1966). See generally Cootner, Stock Prices: Random
versus Systematic Changes, 3 INDUS. MANAGEMENT REv., Spring 1962, at 24; Van Home &
Parker, Technical Trading Rules: 4 Comment, FINANCIAL ANALYSTS J., July-Aug. 1968, at 128.
87. See generally LoRiE & HAmiLTON 71-82; Stanford Note 1041-44. See also authorities
cited at notes 85-86 supra.
88. Stanford Note 1044. See generally LoRIE & HAMILTON 83-87.
89. Stanford Note 1044.
90. Id
91. See, e.g., Ball & Brown, An Empirical Evaluation of Accounting Income Numbers, 6 J.
AccouNTING RESEARCH 159 (1968) (analyzing the impact of corporate annual earnings reports
on stock prices and concluding that the market begins to react even prior to the formal announce-
ment of earnings); Fama, Fisher, Jensen & Roll, The Adjustment of Stock Prices to New
Information, 10 INT'L ECON. REv. 1 (1969) (examining the effect on the market of stock splits by
NYSE-listed stocks during 1927-1959); Scholes, The Marketfor Securities: Substitution versus Price
Pressure and the Effects ofInformation on Share Prices, 45 J. Bus. 179 (1972) (examining the effect
upon stock prices of secondary offerings of common stock).
92. Stanford Note 1044.
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mal announcement of the information.93
A second type of semistrong test is directed towards ascertaining
the types of currently available information to which the market will
respond. Specifically, such a test measures the market's reaction to in-
formation that, although not formally publicized, can be derived from
information that is freely available. Assuming the validity of the
semistrong form assertion that the market absorbs all publicly avail-
able information, the market will not respond to the announcement of
information that was already deducible from previously released infor-
mation.94 Nor will the market respond to financial information which
is solely the result of cosmetic changes in accounting methods or to
other similar information that does not alter the underlying economic
worth of the security.95
These propositions have been borne out by studies which have ex-
amined the effect upon stock prices of various accounting changes.
96
Overwhelmingly, these studies indicate that resultant changes in stock
prices reflect only the actual economic significance of the accounting
changes, such as altered tax consequences, and do not merely reflect the
cosmetic changes in the reported figures. 97 Such empirical results pro-
93. See, id 1046 and authorities cited at n.77 therein. Such pre-announcement adjustments
are consistent with efficient capital market theory, insofar as they support the inference that the
market reacts speedily to all available information, including the leaks which inevitably precede
formal announcements.
94. In other words, the market is presumed to know something as soon as it becomes knowa-
ble, without the necessity of a formal public announcement.
95. See Stanford Note 1048.
96. See Kaplan & Roll, Investor Evaluation of Accounting Information: Some Empirical
Evidence, 45 J. Bus. 225 (1972) (studying the effect upon stock price of a change in investment tax
credit reporting from deferral to flow-through and in depreciation from accelerated to straight line
method); Sunder, Relatinsho Between Accounting Changes and Stock Prices: Problems of Mea-
surement and Some Empirical Evidence, 11 J. ACCOUNTING RESEARCH 1 (Supp. 1973) (examining
stock prices changes following inventory accounting method changes from first in, first out (FIFO)
to last in, first out (LIFO), or vice versa); Sunder, Stock Price and Risk Related to Accounting
Changes in Inventory Valuation, 50 ACCOUNTING REV. 305, 314 (1975) (also dealing with inven-
tory accounting changes).
97. Stanford Note 1047-50. Consider, for example, Sunder's study of inventory accounting
changes. Normally, a switch from FIFO to LIFO will result in a decrease in reported earnings
(assuming that the cost of inventory is rising), insofar as the change will increase the cost of goods
sold by utilizing higher priced inventory first. However, this accounting change has no real effect
on the underlying cost of the inventory. The change may, however, produce real economic bene-
fit in the form of tax deferrals, since the recognition of income has been deferred. If the market
responds to cosmetic accounting changes, it would tend to fall when reported earnings per share
fall; if, however, it responds only to underlying economic realities, the market price should in-
crease to reflect the monetary benefits of a tax deferral. Sunders study found that the market
responded in the latter fashion, thus reinforcing the semi-strong ECMH assertion that the market
responds rapidly to real economic changes while ignoring merely cosmetic changes or redundant
announcements of information already available and reflected in existing prices. See Sunder,
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vide additional support for the ECMH in its semistrong form.
The strong form of the ECMH asserts that even nonpublic infor-
mation is reflected rapidly in security prices. This is not to assert that
investors who have access to such information cannot exploit it so as to
earn disproportionate returns; rather, the strong form hypothesizes that
few investors have access to such nonpublic information not already
reflected in securities prices. Even where such access exists, it is usu-
ally for brief periods only, since the information begins to go public the
moment it is traded upon, so that no individual investor is capable of
sustaining disproportionate returns. 8
Although there is significant evidence supporting the strong form
of the ECMH,99 there is also evidence of some deviations from this
form of market efficiency. In particular, studies have indicated that in-
sider trading, 100 presumably based upon nonpublic information regard-
Relationship Between Accounting Changes and Stock Prices: Problems of Measurement and Some
Empirical Evidence, supra note 96, at 17-26.
98. See Stanford Note 1050-52.
99. Most tests of the strong form of the ECMH look to the rates of return realized by inves-
tors who might be expected to have access to nonpublic information. A finding that such inves-
tors are consistently able to earn rates of return superior to those of the average investor would
tend to undermine the strong form ECMH. However, with the possible exceptions of insider and
specialist trading, discussed at text accompanying notes 100-01 infra, numerous studies have
failed to reveal any group of investors who consistently earn disproportionate returns by virtue of
access to nonpublic information not already reflected in stock prices. For example, mutual funds
are normally supported by teams of sophisticated and comprehensive securities analysts who, by
virtue both of their financial sophistication and of their proximity to information sources, might
be expected to have access to significant amounts of information unavailable to the general invest-
ing public. Yet studies have found that mutual funds do not, on the average, yield returns any
higher than the market as a whole. See, e.g., HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN
COMMERCE, A STUDY OF MUTUAL FUNDS H.R. REP. No. 2274, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962); I.
FRIEND, M. BLUME & J. CROCKETT, MUTUAL FUNDS AND OTHER INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, A
NEW PERSPECTIVE (1970); Jensen, Risk, The Pricing of CapitalAssets, and the Evaluation of Invest-
ment Portfolios, 42 J. Bus. 167 (1969); Jensen, The Performance of Mutual Funds in the Period
1945-1964, 23 J. FINANCE 389 (1968); Sharpe, Mutual Fund Performance, 39 J. Bus. 119 (1966);
Williamson, Measurement and Forecasting of Mutual Fund Performance: Choosing an Investment
Strategy, FINANCIAL ANALYSTS J., Nov.-Dec. 1972, at 78. See generally LoRiE & HAMILTON 87-
97.
100. See the authorities cited in Stanford Note 1052 n.105 for evidence of profitable trading by
insiders. Although these studies would seem to indicate that insiders can earn above-average
returns when trading on inside information, it is important to note that a given insider is unlikely
to be capable of sustaining disproportionate returns for any length of time, both because he cannot
always expect to be in possession of valuable information and because he must take great precau-
tions not to run afoul of the series of court decisions in recent years imposing strict sanctions on
insider trading. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228
(2d Cir. 1974); Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). Thus, when compared with the aggregate volume of trading on




ing a firm's future prospects, as well as upon trading by NYSE
specialists 0 whose special status provides exposure to nonpublic infor-
mation indicating the likely direction of future stock prices, does in
many instances give rise to rates of return higher than those exper-
ienced by the market as a whole. However, these minor deviations
from the general model of the strong form ECMH do not significantly
alter the fact that, in general, the market conforms to the ECMH.
Implicit in the above discussion of the ECMH are three basic as-
sumptions: first, that investors operate within the same time horizons
and have homogeneous expectations with regard to prices; second, that
investors have access to the market on equal terms (that is, transaction
costs are the same for everyone); and third, that information is avail-
able at little or no cost to all interested parties. 102 These "ideal" char-
acteristics are obviously not entirely present in any existing market.
However, in order for there to be an efficient market, there must be
some approximation of these conditions. One commentator has stated
that it is sufficient, absent agreement regarding the implications of cut-
rent information and expectations regarding price movements, that
there be no evidence of consistently superior or inferior performance
by significant participants in the market, that transaction costs be "rea-
sonable" and that information be available to a "sufficient" number of
investors. 10 3
Any significant departure from these conditions threatens to result
in an inefficient market in which stock prices imperfectly reflect avail-
able information, a situation that facilitates the existence of mispriced
stocks. A market characterized by a widespread nonhomogeneity of
expectations as to price, caused by a sharp divergence of views as to the
appropriate method of stock valuation, will contain mispriced stocks as
a result of conflicting and often incorrect analysis of available informa-
tion. Similarly, if investors with transaction costs significantly less
than other investors engage in a substantial amount of market activity,
prices will reflect not only generally available information but also spe-
cial advantages enjoyed by certain investors, and the stock will be mis-
101. See Niederhoffer & Osborne, Market Making and Jeversal on the Stock Exchange, 61 J.
AM. STATisTic~A. Ass'N 897 (1966) (concluding that NYSE specialists are able to earn above-
average returns by virtue of their access to information about market price structure). NYSE
specialists are legally entitled to use this information when trading for their own account in mar-
ket-making, and they are neither required nor allowed to disclose it to investors in general. See
generally Wolfson & Russo, The Stock Exchange Specialist: An Economic and Legal Analysis,
1970 DUKE L. J. 707 for a discussion of the stock exchange specialist system. Again, however,
this represents only a minor deviation from strong form market efficiency.
102. See note 85 supra. See LoRIE & HAMILTON 80; Stanford Note 1040 n.38.
103. Fama, supra note 70, at 387-88.
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priced. Finally, where access to investment information is restricted,
either absolutely or by virtue of cost considerations, there is clearly an
impediment to the rapid adjustment of the market to reflect such infor-
mation. This presents the opportunity for those in possession of such
information to take advantage of the delayed market reaction in order
to realize superior gains."°
B. How Tender Offer Arbitrage Impairs the Efficiency of the Market.
The announcement of a tender offer should not, in itself, have any
effect on the efficiency of the market. The participation of arbitrageurs
in the tender offer process, however, does operate to impair the effi-
ciency of the market, resulting in overpriced target stock.
With the announcement of a tender offer, complications enter the
valuation process for target stock because thereafter stock prices reflect
not only "investment potential" but also the possibility of obtaining a
premium for shares tendered to the offeror. If arbitrageurs were not
involved, the market, under the ECMH, should be expected to reflect
this new factor rapidly, offset by the risks involved in the tender offer.
Thus, market price will rise, but not to the level of the tender price."°'
Since, absent arbitrage, the basic assumptions underlying the
ECMH remain in force, the market remains efficient. Investors' expec-
tations certainly change with the introduction of a new factor into the
valuation process, but the key point is that expectations change uni-
formly because all investors are faced with the same decision. Homo-
geneity of expectation therefore persists. Likewise, since transaction
costs to investors are not affected, access to the market is available on
the same terms as before the offer. Finally, the practical necessity of
communicating the terms of the offer to target shareholders, as well as
SEC disclosure requirements, makes information regarding the terms
and conditions of the offer immediately available to the public.
When arbitrage enters the picture, however, the natural efficiency
of the market is disrupted, because large-scale arbitrageur participation
runs counter to several of the underlying assumptions of an efficient
market.
First, arbitrageur intervention destroys homogeneity of expecta-
tion among target shareholders. Those shareholders not involved in
arbitraging the transaction (the "investors") must consider the value of
the stock as a continuing investment should the tender offer fail, its
104. See text accompanying note 98 supra.
105. Note that the market price may rise above the tender price if competing offers are likely.
See notes 33-34 supra and accompanying text.
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value as a continuing investment should the shareholder not tender and
the offer nevertheless succeed, its value if tendered and accepted, its
value if tendered and prorated, and its value on the market. The arbi-
trageur's expectations, on the other hand, are much simpler. He ig-
nores the investment potential of the stock (except as a factor in his
initial evaluation of the chances of success for the offer), because he has
no intention of becoming an "investor."106 The arbitrageur's sole con-
cern is what he can earn by tendering his stock. This nonhomogeneity
of expectations among investors and arbitrageurs necessarily gives rise
to inconsistent valuations of target stock by investors and arbitrageurs.
Second, the assumption that investors have equal access to the
market is violated because arbitrageurs are able to avoid a substantial
part of the transaction costs paid by investors10 7 and in most cases can
rely on ultimately receiving a soliciting dealer's fee. 08 This in effect
guarantees arbitrageurs a price higher than that available to investors
for tendered stock. Thus, unlike the normal situation where transac-
tion costs have a slight overall impact upon the market, 0 9 the virtual
absence of transaction costs to the arbitrageur allows him to exploit
small per-share differentials on a large volume scale in situations where
the ordinary investor's profit margin would be entirely absorbed by
transaction costs. This one-two punch, consisting of lower costs to ac-
quire target stock, coupled with higher proceeds upon tendering, allows
arbitrageurs profitably to bid higher for target stock than investors,
contributing to the overpricing of target stock, and, hence, to the ineffi-
ciency of the market.
The combination of differing expectations among investors and
arbitrageurs and unequal access to the market creates target stock that
is overpriced from the perspective of the investor. Arbitrageurs tend to
dominate purchases on the market during pendency of the tender offer
because they are willing (due to differing expectations) and able (be-
106. The arbitrageur intends to hold his target stock only long enough to tender it and has no
desire to ride the market. See, e.g., Huge Profits Out of Tiny Margins, supra note 1, where the
author observes that arbitrageurs "intensely dislike ordinary trading-even more than they dislike
taking losses. 'If you're caught when a merger falls through, then you become---' and Greenburg
[a leading arbitrageur] shudders at the word--'an investor."' Id 120.
107. See note 130 infra and accompanying text.
108. See note 131 infra and text accompanying notes 131-33 infra.
109. In a typical investment situation, where the investor holds stock for several years, collects
dividends and perhaps ultimately disposes of his holdings at a gain, the brokerage commission
costs incurred by the investor will likely be a relatively insignificant percentage of the total income
produced by the investment. In an arbitrage situation, however, where profitability lies in the
ability to exploit small per-share differentials on a volume scale, any cost which eats into that
small per-share margin will have a major impact upon profitability.
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cause of price advantage) to pay more than the value of the stock to the
general investing public.
The following sections of this Comment will examine the effect of
this diagnosed market inefficiency upon the balance of tender offer reg-
ulation and upon the economy as a whole.
C. Tender Offer Arbitrage and the Regulatory Balance.
The Williams Act amendments".0 to the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934111 were enacted in response to perceived inequities in the
tender offer process. The Williams Act was intended to strike a bal-
ance between offeror and target management, so that neither would
possess a distinct advantage solely by virtue of its position.' 12 The pro-
visions of the Act attempt to provide both sides with equal access to
target shareholders for the purpose of presenting information relevant
to an evaluation of the merits of the outstanding offer, while imposing
concomitant disclosure requirements.' 13 Additionally, the Act was
designed to remove some of the pressure to tender from the tender offer
process by establishing a mandatory period during which tendered
shares could be withdrawn and by abolishing first-come, first-served
offers. 1 4 The apparent logic of the Act is that informed investors in an
110. Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 781-78n (1964)).
111. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976).
112. The Senate report accompanying S. 510 noted that "extreme care" was taken "to avoid
tipping the balance of regulation either in favor of management or in favor of the person making
the takeover bid." S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 3 (1967); accord, H.R. REP. No. 1711,
90th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1968).
Likewise, Senator Williams advocated neutrality between offeror and target management,
stating "[w]e have taken extreme care to avoid tipping the scales either in favor of management or
in favor of the person making the takeover bid. S. 510 is designed solely to require full and fair
disclosure for the benefit of investors." 113 CONG. REc. 24664 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Williams).
Manuel Cohen, then chairman of the SEC, testified at the hearings on S. 510 that "the princi-
pal point is that we are not concerned with assisting or hurting either side. We are [only] con-
cerned with the investor ...." Hearings on S. 510 Before the SubcomnL on Securities of the
Senate Comm on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 178 (1967).
113. The offeror is required to make extensive disclosures, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)(1),
78n(d)(1) (1976), prior to launching a tender offer, and target management is also required to
make disclosures, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(4) (1976), before recommending to its sharehold-
ers acceptance or rejection of the offer.
114. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5)-(6) (1976). Terms such as these were thought to increase
pressure on shareholders to tender before they could be exposed to the often-conflicting views of
incumbent management by creating the fear that any delay in tendering would result in the share-
holder being left out. Hayes & Taussig state that "if [the offeror] is allowed to accept shares on a
first-come, first-served basis, he may encourage stockholders to tender their shares before they can
be reached by the blandishments of the incumbents or rival bidders." Hayes & Taussig, supra
note 25, at 141. Swanson observes that "[tihe advantage of using the first-come-first-served
method of acceptance is that the shareholders will be prone to rush immediately to tender their
shares in order not to be left behind." Swanson, supra note 25, at 436.
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unpressured environment will reach the correct conclusion as to the
merits of an offer."15
One may assume, consistent with the apparent views of Congress
in enacting the Williams Act, that, absent the effects of arbitrage, the
rational investor will base his decision whether or not to tender upon
an evaluation of the merits of the offer. The investor will have a
stronger incentive to ascertain whether the terms of the offer are fair
and adequate and whether the offer is in the best interests of the target
company. It is not a foregone conclusion that the investor will tender.
He is more concerned with obtaining a suitable long-term rate of return
on his capital (as opposed to a quick, one-time profit) and might well
be thoroughly satisfied with his present investment. In many cases,
therefore, there is a significant possibility that the investor will choose
not to tender. If the target stock is held by investors (as opposed to
arbitrageurs), this possibility translates into a substantial risk that the
tender offer will not succeed.
In contrast, the presence of large-scale arbitrage in a tender offer
creates pressure upon shareholders to sell without regard to the merits
of the offer itself, tipping the balance in favor of offerors, in direct con-
flict with the intent of the Williams Act. The arbitrageur's only pur-
pose in accumulating a position in the target company is that of
subsequently tendering for a profit. With regard to the stock in his
possession, there is no risk that the arbitrageur will not tender. It is
easy to see that, as the arbitrageurs corner a significant share of the
market, the character of the risk involved is altered. As the success of
the offer becomes more likely, arbitrageurs can afford to pay more for
target stock in light of diminished risks, and the pressure upon inves-
tors to sell is progressively escalated. At some point, the arbitrageurs
may acquire such a large share of the market that the risk of failure of
the offer is virtually nil, and the only remaining risk is that of prora-
tion.
The crucial point to be drawn from the above discussion is not that
arbitrageurs remove the risk from the market during a tender offer, for
in fact they also must allow for risk. Rather, arbitrageur participation
115. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1)(1976). Senator Williams, when introducing the Williams Act
on the Senate floor, stated. "This legislation will close a significant gap in investor protection
under the Federal securities laws by requiring the disclosure of pertinent information to stock-
holders when persons seek to obtain control of a corporation by a cash tender offer ...... 113
CONG. REc. 854 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Williams).
Likewise, Manuel Cohen, then chairman of the SEC, testified before the Senate Banking and
Currency Subcommittee on Securities: "[Tihe general approach of... this bill, is to provide the
investor, the person who is required to make a decision, an opportunity to examine and to assess
the relevant facts. ... Hearings on S. 510, supra note 112, at 15.
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implies that the risk itself is diminished, thus allowing for an upward
shift in the market for target stock, in many cases to levels in excess of
the tender price.' 6 This price movement creates an intense pressure
on investors to sell into the market without regard for the underlying
merits of the tender offer and, hence, to sell into the hands of the arbi-
trageurs. The arbitrageur can offer a price that investors, who presum-
ably are seeking to avoid risk, simply cannot afford to ignore.
Restated in terms of ECMH analysis, the investor in an inefficient mar-
ket who is in possession of a stock identified as overpriced has but one
rational choice-sell!
The role of institutional investors should be emphasized in assess-
ing the impact of the pressures generated by arbitrage. In recent years,
institutional investors such as mutual funds, insurance companies, pen-
sion plans and trust departments have come to own increasingly large
portions of outstanding securities.' 7 Such investors tend also to be
more active in trading than are their noninstitutional counterparts." 8
Typically, institutional investors will be interested in the riskless alter-
native offered by the arbitrageur. They have no desire to see their
funds tied up for long periods of time in a contest for control; they are
usually grateful to be given the chance to avoid the difficult decision of
whether or not to tender." 9 Insofar as arbitrageurs make a market for
116. See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
117. See R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION 24-33 (3d ed. 1972) (quoting
from an SEC study of institutional investors indicating the shift between 1952 and 1968 of large
equity holdings from the hands of individuals into the hands of institutional investors).
118. Id 14-23.
119. Where the institutional investor owns a block of common stock in the target corporation,
and nothing more, its wisest course in the event of a tender offer is normally to sell on the market
(into the hands of the arbitrageurs) and to reinvest its capital elsewhere. This alternative is typi-
cally more favorable to the institutional investor than is tendering because it avoids the possible
delays which a contested tender offer might occasion (effectively tying up the institutional inves-
tor's capital) and also circumvents the adverse financial consequences of proration if more shares
are tendered than will be taken under the terms of the offer. These adverse financial conse-
quences are two-fold. First, the investor may be forced to sell his unaccepted shares at a loss on a
falling market or else to occupy the status of minority shareholder at the mercy of the policies of a
new and perhaps hostile management. Second, the investor may suffer adverse tax consequences
if the cash offer is followed by a reorganization within the meaning of I.R.C. § 368(a)(1). If a
merger occurs within a short period after the tender offer, then the two transactions may be
deemed one for tax purposes, in which case target shareholders whose earlier tender was prorated
may well be viewed as having received offeror stock and boot in the form of cash. Under I.R.C. §
356(a)(2), such an unfortunate shareholder may then be taxed at ordinary income, as opposed to
capital gain, rates. See Possible Trapsfor Shareholders in Tender Offers, 28 J. TAx. 256 (1968).
A sale on the market will, however, avoid this problem and assure capital gain treatment.
The institutional investor's position is more complicated when its involvement with the target
extends beyond mere ownership of common stock and includes, for example, ownership of pre-
ferred stock, bonds, notes or debentures, or involves other relatively long-term loan commitments
to the target corporation. In such a case, the institutional investor is between the proverbial rock
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large blocks of shares held by institutional investors, arbitrage contrib-
utes substantially to the successful outcome of tender offers.
By way of empirical observation, the pressure exerted by arbi-
trageurs is effective in most cases. It is estimated that arbitrageurs
often surface with more than one-half of all target stock tendered.12 0
D. The Potential Consequences of The Regulatory Imbalance.
Accepting the premise that pressure exerted by arbitrageurs on in-
vestors has the effect of enhancing the tender offer's chances for suc-
cess, it follows that many (if not most) tender offers succeed for reasons
only tangentially related to the merits of the offer itself. Because of the
profound impact arbitrage has on the underlying chances for success of
the tender offer, it is virtually impossible to say which offers would fail
but for the effect of arbitrage. The fact that the riskless price offered
by arbitrageurs was deemed sufficient by investors says nothing about
the manner in which investors would have reacted had the market re-
mained at the lower level it would have occupied absent the effect of
arbitrage. Nevertheless, it is safe to say that in many cases such an
offer might not have succeeded on its merits and may thus be regarded
as "artificially induced" by arbitrage.
Artificially induced takeovers may produce long-term deleterious
effects upon the economy. Such takeovers lend support to a widespread
public sentiment that the conglomerate corporate structure of our econ-
omy is becoming top-heavy, unmanageable and unresponsive. The ef-
fect of takeovers in recent years is aptly illustrated by considering the
fate of the "vanishing Fortune 500. 121 The occurrence of unmerited
and the hard place. The investor with substantial loan commitments to the target will often have
a cozy arrangement with target management which it does not desire to see disrupted. Moreover,
it may have legitimate reasons for not wishing to tender, even at a healthy premium, when such a
course of action would entail loss of voting influence in the target corporation and would in effect
leave the investor's nonvoting nonequity interests in the target at the mercy of a new and possibly
hostile management team. Yet, if the investor does not tender or sell, it may have to deal with a
lawsuit by one of its shareholders or beneficiaries alleging a breach of fiduciary duty arising from
its failure to cash in on the premium proffered by the offeror. Although the institutional investor
might well win such a suit, the bottom line is that it does not relish the thought of being put in the
position of defending such a suit in the first place. Often, when faced with this dilemma, the
institutional investor will opt for selling its shares on the market as the safest course of action,
even though it means relinquishing any voting power formerly held in the target. Interestingly,
institutional investors, who live in perpetual fear of finding themselves in the above dilemma, are
at present one of the more powerful special-interest factions pushing for legislation aimed at tight-
ening existing controls on the tender offer process.
120. See Henry 466; O'Boyle, supra note 42, at 866; Gf Huge Profits Out of Tiny Margins,
supra note 1, at 116 (observing that arbitrageurs sometimes emerge with more than 90% of the
stock exchanged in a merger).
121. In recent years, many of the top corporations in this country have been absorbed by
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takeovers solely through the force of arbitrage also poses the threat of
replacing qualified management with less qualified successors, contrib-
uting to a misallocation of resources in the economy.' 22  Moreover, ar-
tificially induced takeovers do not generate significant amounts of
economic growth in terms of new business or new jobs. 23  They do,
however, generate enormous costs in the form of litigation, information
dissemination and related expenses. 24 These costs are ultimately
borne by the economy as a whole, thus decreasing the overall return on
capital.
The psychological impact of such takeovers on the business com-
munity should not be lightly dismissed. The knowledge that everyone
is a potential target, subject to being devoured in an artificially induced
takeover, contributes to an atmosphere of fear, distrust and secrecy
tender offers and mergers. In 1977, for example, more than 100 publicly listed companies lost their
independence as a result of takeovers. See Kissinger, Against Forced Takeovers, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 22, 1978, § 4, at 19, col. 2. The forced takeover process has even triggered concern in the
antitrust area:
antitrust experts in Washington have begun to worry over the concentration of economic
power that results from such mergers. Perhaps more important, there are growing fears
that the rash of takeovers may actually distort the nation's economy as companies use
their funds to acquire others rather than invest in new plants and equipment to create
new jobs and improve productivity.
The Merger Rage, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 16, 1978, at 88.
122. Consider the remarks of one corporate executive officer:
In reality, it is not the backward, unproductive company that is sought in the tender
process. The records of Copperwell, Microdot, Carborundum and others were excellent.
Rather, today's raiders focus on the more successful enterprise whose record of growth
makes it an attractive target. Given this fact, is the shareholder who is rarely as well
equipped as the aggressor to evaluate a company's potential, likely to benefit by being
removed from long-term ownership in return for an immediate premium?
Once a takeover has been accomplished, destruction of the chemistry within a high-
ly motivated management team tends to be as inevitable as it is disheartening. I ques-
tion whether the resulting curtailment of a company's momentum is compensated for by
so-called synergistic benefits. Numerous interviews with those who have been through it
confirm my conviction that it is not.
Kissinger, supra note 121, at 19.
123. The takeover process in itself accomplishes nothing more than a shift in control of the
enterprise. It neither wins new customers nor creates new jobs; in many cases, it does precisely
the opposite. Although the proponents of forced takeovers claim that such acquisitions do create
economic growth in the form of synergistic benefits (ie., the notion that I + 1 = 3), such a claim
is, at best, dubious and probably is offset by the disruptive effects occasioned where a highly
successful company is overrun by an acquisition-minded offeror. See note 122 supra.
124. According to Kissinger, in 1977 alone
[more than $20 billion of corporate cash resources that could have been used to create
new production and employment opportunities will have instead been devoted to rear-
ranging the ownership of existing properties.
The unproductive use of time and legal fees is enormous, and the negative impact on
people's lives within the target company can be severe.
Kissinger, supra note 121, at 19.
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among corporate managements12-a phenomenon fundamentally in
conflict with the basic premise of an efficient marketplace that informa-
tion should be freely available to investors.'2 6
E. The Casefor Elimination of Windfall Premiums to Target
Shareholders and Arbitrageurs.
Clearly, many target shareholders receive windfall premiums
when they sell to the arbitrageurs. The windfall consists of the portion
of the price received by the shareholder that results from overpricing in
an inefficient market, or, stated alternatively, consists of the increment
in market price attributable to diminished risk by virtue of arbitrageur
participation in the offer. Likewise, the arbitrageur clearly realizes
huge profits from his activities. It is appropriate to question the legiti-
macy of these windfall premiums.
A leading defense for arbitrage has always been that it does not
hurt the target shareholders. Perhaps the question should be whether
it helps them too much. Certainly, one of the primary goals of the
securities laws in general, and the William Act in particular, is investor
protection. 27 There is, however, a distinction between protecting the
investor and guaranteeing him the right to reap a windfall profit. At
some point, it becomes myopic to view securities legislation as aimed
solely at improving the investor's position. One must also examine ef-
fects on the economy as a whole.
The existing tender offer legislation was intended to strike a bal-
ance, in light of which a tender offer would succeed or fail on its own
merits after an opportunity for careful consideration by the target
shareholders.12 8  Absent the interference of arbitrage, this is arguably
what would happen.12 9 This process, in an efficient market, is itself
125. See generally id Indeed, as Kissinger notes, most of the recent commentary on the take-
over phenomenon tends to ignore entirely the issue of the basic equities involved, particularly as it
relates to incumbent management, who might well have performed excellently in developing the
target into a successful operation only to find themselves suddenly out of work, the victims of a
takeover facilitated by the present imbalance of tender offer regulation.
This growing sense of the basic inequity, in many instances, of forced takeovers has led many
corporate executives to begin taking an active role in pressing for increased regulation of tender
offers. See, e.g., Letter from IL Eberstadt, Jr., President and Chief Executive Officer of Microdot,
Inc., to Chief Executive Officers of FoRTUNE 1000 companies (Mar. 5, 1976), reprintedin J. FLOM,
M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, supra note 58, at 278-81.
126. See text accompanying note 102 supra.
127. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 22-35 (1977). See notes 112-15
supra and text accompanying notes 110-15 supra.
128. See notes 112-15 supra and accompanying text.
129. Were the target shareholders not under economic pressure (generated by arbitrage) to
take the easy way out, Ze., to sell on the market at a premium, they would be forced to confront
the merits of the offer. That result would not only be consistent with the congressional objective
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sufficient protection for the investor. When arbitrage enters the pic-
ture, the balance is tipped, giving rise to deleterious long-term eco-
nomic consequences, and shareholders are permitted to enjoy windfalls
that cannot fairly be argued to have been intended by the securities
laws.
Moreover, the uniquely advantageous position held by most arbi-
trageurs legitimates the need for heightened regulation of their activi-
ties. In particular, arbitrageurs enjoy commission advantages when
purchasing and selling on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), they
typically collect a soliciting dealer's fee for shares tendered and they
are in a position to unload quickly if the offer falls through. Most
professional arbitrageurs own seats on the NYSE and act as broker-
dealers on their own account, thereby avoiding broker-dealer commis-
sions (which comprise the bulk of transaction costs) while paying only
obligatory transfer taxes and specialist fees. 3' Furthermore, the terms
of most tender offers provide for the receipt by broker-dealers of a
soliciting dealer's fee for all shares tendered (including those on their
own account) upon execution of a soliciting dealer's agreement. 131
of providing investors with full disclosure so as to facilitate their arrival at an informed decision,
but would also benefit the economy by helping to insure that only meritorious takeovers occur.
130. See ARANow & EiNHoRN 175 n.5. The average investor, who is not a member of the
stock exchange, must employ a broker-dealer to make his purchases and sales on the market and
must pay a commission which includes a fee for the broker as well as floor brokerage charges
(specialist's fees) if the transaction is handled through a specialist. See R. JENNINGS & H.
MARSH, supra note 117, at 690-711, 731-33 for a discussion of the specialist system employed by
the NYSE.
Formerly, such fees were fixed by stock exchange rules; however, due to anti-competitive
effects and possible antitrust violations, the SEC promulgated Securities Exchange Act Rule 19b-
3, prohibiting fixed commission rates. 17 C.F.R. § 240.19b-3 (1977). See Exchange Act Release
No. 11203, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 80,067 (describing the new
rule and the reasons for its promulgation). In a follow-up report to Congress, the SEC observed
that the primary impact of the unfixing of commission rates was a reduction of commission costs
to institutional investors. The SEC estimated commission costs to institutional investors, in cents
per share, as averaging 17.6 cents in September 1976 and 17.2 cents in November 1976. Com-
parable figures for individual investors were 29.4 cents and 27.5 cents, respectively. See Summary
of Securities and Exchange Commission's Fourth Report to Congress on the Effect of the Absence
of Fixed Rates of Commissions, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,934.
This differential between institutional and individual investors is most likely due to the brokers'
increased willingness to negotiate with institutional investors, which provide an ever-increasing
share of their business and which typically trade in larger blocks of stock than individuals, giving
rise to economies of scale for the broker.
131. A soliciting dealer is a broker-dealer who, in return for a fee, will agree to act as a "mid-
dleman" of sorts in a tender offer, collecting tendered shares from target shareholders and turning
them over to the offeror. For reasons to be discussed at text accompanying note 133 infra, most
tender offers make provisions for payment of a fee to soliciting dealers. See, e.g., Colt Industries,
Inc., Offer to Purchase Any and All Outstanding Shares of Common Stock of Garlock, Inc., for
Cash at $32 Per Share Net, reprinted in J. FLOM, M. LnvroN & E. STEINBERGER, supra note 58, at
408:
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Such arrangements have been uniformly upheld against challenges
based on rules lOb-6 and 10b-13 in recent SEC no-action letters, pro-
vided the arbitrageur fully ceases his arbitrage activities prior to exe-
cuting the soliciting dealer's agreement. 132  It is logical to suppose that
such provisions will continue to appear in tender offers, insofar as the
surest way to guarantee the success of a tender offer is to get the arbi-
trageur on your side, and the surest way to win the arbitrageur is by
appealing to his pocketbook with a healthy soliciting dealer's fee. 133
Indeed, in many cases offeror management, when faced with the choice
between upping the offer price or the soliciting dealer's fee, will opt for
the latter.
In addition, it is essential, in the event the offer fails, that the arbi-
trageur be in a position to unload target stock quickly so as to minimize
losses. Membership on the NYSE greatly facilitates this required ease
of access to the market. 134
All of these advantages are traceable to the arbitrageur's status as
a broker-dealer and member of the NYSE. The arbitrageurs are a se-
lect group, 13 5occupying a position and enjoying advantages well out of
reach for the average investor.136  Cumulatively, the advantages inur-
ing to the benefit of arbitrageurs by virtue of their near-monopoly posi-
tion are necessary for their continued success and profitability. 137
The Purchaser will pay to any broker or dealer ... which is a member of a registered
national securities exchange or of the National Association of Securities Dealers,
In.. . .. the name of which appears in the appropriate space in a Letter of Transmittal
and which has solicited the tender to which such Letter of Transmittal relates, a solicita-
tion fee of 60 cents for each share purchased pursuant to the Offer and covered by such
Letter of Transmittal. . . except that no such fee will be paid in respect of Shares ten-
dered by a Soliciting Dealer for its own account unless beneficial ownership thereof was
acquired by such Soliciting Dealer in the performance of arbitrage functions after No-
vember 17, 1975.
This particular provision is somewhat unusual in that it limits a soliciting dealer's ability to
collect a soliciting dealer's fee for shares tendered on its own account to only those situations
where the shares were acquired after the offer was announced for the purpose of arbitraging the
transaction. Thus, it indicates more clearly than most offers how the offeror can use soliciting
dealer's fee provisions to attract the arbitrageur and thereby enhance the chances for success of the
offer.
132. See, e.g., No-Action Letter From SEC Division of Market Regulation to Oak Industries,
Inc. (Nov. 22, 1976), reprintedin [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1 80,858;
No-Action Letter From SEC Division of Market Regulation to Wyly Corp. (Dec. 30, 1976) (avail-
able Jan. 30, 1977). See generally ARANow & EINHORN 187-91.
133. ARANow & EINHORN 187-88. See O'Boyle, supra note 42, at 865-66.
134. See note 57 supra.
135. See note 26 supora.
136. For example, as of 1962, there were only 1,366 memberships on the NYSE. R. JENNINaS
& H. MARSH, supra note 117, at 5. Add to this the fact that such seats, when and if available, sell
for hundreds of thousands of dollars, and it becomes apparent that the special advantages of the
arbitrageur are not within reach of the ordinary investor.
137. Because arbitrage operates on the principle of exploiting small price differentials on a
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These advantages should impose concomitant duties upon the arbi-
trageur, who should not be allowed to exploit his near-monopoly in
derogation of the balance sought to be struck by the securities laws.
IV. THE FORM PROPOSED REGULATIONS SHOULD TAKE
Careful consideration of the factors giving rise to the problems dis-
cussed above leads to the conclusion that the most effective mode of
regulation to achieve the desired goal of reinstating a balance between
offeror and target would consist of imposing across-the-board volume
limitations upon purchases of target shares during the pendency of the
tender offer.
Although the trend of recent Supreme Court decisions has been to
indicate that full and adequate disclosure is the sole remedy proposed
by the Williams Act, which should alone suffice to achieve the underly-
ing goal of investor protection, 138 disclosure would clearly be an inade-
quate and meaningless remedy in the arbitrage situation. First, there
is nothing of substance for the arbitrageur to disclose beyond his mere
status and the results of his evaluation of the particular tender offer in
question. Were the arbitrageur merely to "state his name and occupa-
tion" for the record, there would be no benefit to investors and no effect
on the outcome of the offer, insofar as the sophisticated investor al-
ready knows whether or not the arbitrageur is at work and his less in-
formed fellow shareholders most likely do not care. To require the
arbitrageur to make public the results of his evaluation of the offer
would involve going far beyond existing requirements for disclosure of
"inside information," into the realm of disclosure of "market informa-
tion," a step which arguably is not justified even by a liberal reading of
the securities laws and which few courts would endorse.139 Moreover,
such disclosure ultimately would be futile since the results of the arbi-
trageur's analysis tend to be reflected almost immediately in the market
price of the target stock.1" Thus, disclosure would fail to strike at the
large-volume scale, any loss of advantage which cuts into this narrow margin will have an im-
mense aggregate effect upon the profitability of arbitrage operations. See note 109 supra and
accompanying text. Were arbitrageurs to lose their special commission and soliciting dealer ad-
vantages, they would be reduced to the level of ordinary investor and would, at the very least,
have to curtail their operations severely.
138. See, e.g., Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977); Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper
Corp., 422 U.S. 49 (1975).
139. See generally Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, 4n Initial Inquiry Into the Responsibility
to Disclose Market Information, 121 U.PA.L. REv. 798 (1973), and cases discussed therein.
140. Assuming an efficient market, the conclusions reached by arbitrageurs through an analy-
sis of market information would already be reflected in the market price of target stock by the time
formal disclosure machinery could be set into motion. Hence, such disclosure would be essen-
tially meaningless.
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root of the problem, which is the arbitrage activity itself. A second
problem plaguing any attempt to impose disclosure requirements upon
arbitrageurs would be the difficulty, if not impossibility, of formulating
an adequate definition of "arbitrageur"--one which would sweep
broad enough to be effective and yet would avoid ensnaring legitimate
investors not involved in arbitrage. Such difficulty is aptly illustrated
by analogy to the SEC's continuing inability to formulate a satisfactory
all-inclusive definition of "tender offer."' 41
A more plausible scheme for the regulation of arbitrage activity 142
141. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 12676, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 1 80,659, at 86,695-96; ARANOW & EINHORN 69-70; ARANOW, EINHORN & BERL.-
STEIN 1-2. The SEC's reluctance to attempt a definition of the term "tender offer" is the conse-
quence of fears that, were such a definition employed, transactions would subsequently arise
which should be regulated but which could not be reached under the literal terms of the definition.
A similar problem would also likely arise if a narrow definition of "arbitrage" were attempted.
142. Until very recently, any proposal for regulation of arbitrage activity would have been
written on a clean slate. However, it now appears that recently issued FTC rules and regulations
may have the indirect and largely unintended effect of imposing maximum limits upon arbi-
trageur involvement in certain offers. These new rules and regulations, effective September 5,
1978, were designed to implement the recently enacted pre-merger notification requirements of
section 7A of the Clayton Act, Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Title II, 15
U.S.C. § 18a (1976). See 43 Fed. Reg. 33,449-557, 34,443-53, 36,053-54 (1978) (to be codified in
16 C.F.R. §§ 801-803). Their basic thrust is to impose disclosure requirements and a waiting
period upon certain acquisitions that exceed specified threshold amounts.
During the time these rules were under consideration, comments were received by the FTC
which urged creation of an exemption for professional risk arbitrageurs. The FTC rejected these
suggestions, but did hint that arbitrageurs might be entitled to the limited exemption provided for
broker-dealers pursuant to § 802.64. 43 Fed. Reg. 33,519 (1978). Assuming this exemption ap-
plies, arbitrageurs would be exempt from disclosure and waiting period requirements unless their
individual holdings in the target ultimately exceeded both $25 million in value and 15% of the
target's outstanding voting securities. 43 Fed. Reg. 33,547 (1978) (to be codified in 16 C.F.R. §
802.64). Even without the exemption, individual arbitrageurs would not be affected unless their
holdings equal or exceed either $15 million in value or 15% of the target's outstanding voting
securities. Clayton Act § 7A(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 18a(a)(3)(1976); 43 Fed. Reg. 33,539 (1978) (to be
codified in 16 C.F.R. § 801.1(h)).
Therefore, these new rules are not likely to have a significant impact on arbitrage activities in
most situations. They will be relevant only where an individual arbitrageur aggregates holdings
in the target in such an amount as to exceed the above thresholds. The practical effect of the rules
will be that arbitrageurs will consciously endeavor not to exceed the threshold amounts. This is
true for two reasons. First, even though the disclosure statement is ostensibly confidential and is
available only to the FTC, the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department and Congress, arbi-
trageurs are notoriously secretive and in any event are unlikely to be willing to incur the time,
expense and inconvenience of complying with such a requirement. Second, and more important,
is the waiting period requirement. This is especially significant in a cash tender offer. Since the
offeror is acquiring target shares by a cash tender offer, it will be subject only to a 15-day waiting
period. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(b)(1)(B)(1976). However, should the arbitrageur plan to exceed the
threshold amounts by stock exchange purchases, he would be subject to a 30-day waiting period.
Id Thus, the offer would in many cases already have expired before the arbitrageur could legally
make his first purchase of target stock. For this reason, arbitrageurs can be expected to steer clear
of the threshold amounts which would subject them to the rules, and in most cases the rules will
have little or no effect on arbitrageur activity.
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consists of regulations imposing a carefully thought out system of
across-the-board limitations upon trading in the target stock during
pendency of the tender offer. Such regulations could be modeled in
part after the volume limitation formulas employed in SEC proposed
rule 13e-2.143
The implementation of a system of volume limitations upon
purchases would be an effective remedy for the imbalance of tender
offer regulation resulting from large-scale arbitrage. Insofar as the oc-
currence of "artificially induced" takeovers is by definition the direct
result of the tender of large blocks of target shares by a small group of
professional risk arbitrageurs, 144 a system of regulations that effectively
prevented the accumulation of such blocks would operate to curtail or
eliminate entirely such takeovers. Such an approach would have the
additional virtue of avoiding the difficulties inherent in any attempt to
143. See Proposed Rule 13e-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-2 (proposed), 2 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1
23,703 (1973). This rule was first proposed in Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8930, [1969-
1970 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 77,837, and was later revised, due to negative
comment, and reissued in Securities Exchange Act Release No. 10539, [1973 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 79,600. Although the rule has not been formally adopted, the SEC
treats it as if it had been, and, consequently, most corporations comply with its provisions.
Rule 13e-2 regulates, inter alia, an issuer's repurchase of its own shares on a national securi-
ties exchange. The rule sets up basic price and volume limitations, geared to recent averages, in
order to preserve the integrity of the market and to prevent an issuer from manipulating the price
of its stock. Such an approach could be adapted to apply across the board during the pendency of
a tender offer, in order to regulate arbitrage activities and to restore the balance between offeror
and target intended by the Williams Act.
The proposed rule provides in part:
(3) Transactions in securities the principal market for which is an exchange.
(i) No bid for such securities may be made at a price higher than the highest
independent bid or last sale on such exchange, whichever is higher ....
(ii) The amount of such securities which may be purchased in any one day shall be
limited to the higher of:
(a) one round lot (or other unit of trading) per day; or
(b) 15 percent of the average daily trading volume in the principal exchange
market for such security during the preceding four calendar weeks; provided, how-
ever, that if such security is traded on more than one exchange, and/or over-the-
counter, the amount of securities which may be purchased in any one day on each
exchange or in such market may equal 15 percent of the average daily trading vol-
ume during the preceding four calendar weeks on each exchange or in such market,
if the self-regulatory organization with oversight jurisdiction over such market
maintains daily volume data for such security.
2 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 23,703, at 17,244 (1973).
An approach similar to that utilized in the above-quoted section of the proposed rule may be
applied to the problem of regulating purchases of target stock while a tender offer is outstanding.
As in proposed rule 13e-2, the volume limits used should be based upon past trading volumes in
the target stock. The precise formula employed should reflect a balancing of the competing goals
of preserving the access of legitimate investors to the market, while still prohibiting excessive
arbitrage activities which would substantially affect the outcome of the offer. See text preceding
note 151 infra.
144. See text accompanying notes 121-26 supra for a discussion of "artificially induced" take-
overs.
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formulate a satisfactory working definition of arbitrage.145
One possible objection to such a system of regulation is that it
would not pose an effective check on the overall incidence of arbitrage,
but rather would result only in a fragmentation of existing arbitrage
operations and would create an incentive for others to enter the field
and capture part of the business formerly controlled by a select few
arbitrageurs. This objection can be dealt with, however, through the
exercise of care in defining regulatory terms and through proper formu-
lation of the precise volume limits to be implemented. The definition
of who is to be regarded as a "person" for purposes of the regulations
must be carefully drawn so as to prevent existing arbitrageurs from
fragmenting their operations and continuing under the guise of several
legally distinct but commonly controlled entities, or from otherwise
"farming out" their arbitrage "know-how" for profit.146 This could be
accomplished by defining person in a manner analogous to the ap-
proach taken in section 13(d)(3) of the Williams Act,147 so as to include
partnerships, limited partnerships, syndicates or other groups formed
for the purpose of circumventing the effects of the new regulations.1 48
Likewise, there is little reason to fear that there will be a dramatic in-
flux of independent arbitrage operators. If such a phenomenon where
145. See note 141 supra and accompanying text.
146. For instance, if the proposed regulations were drawn only to prevent the arbitrageur from
purchasing more than a specified volume of target shares on his own account, it is conceivable that
arbitrageurs would simply convert their operations so that, instead of purchasing for their own
account, they would be managing the funds of other investors in a collective fashion, allocating
purchases to various individual accounts in order not to exceed individual volume limitations.
This practice is already engaged in by at least two major arbitrage firms which, in addition to
arbitraging for their own account, will periodically take on arbitrage accounts for wealthy individ-
uals. See Wall Street'r Highest Rollers, supra note 13, at 56, where it is noted that Lehman Broth-
ers and Sheriff Securities, Inc. both arbitrage transactions on behalf of wealthy clients, as well as
for their own accounts. Similarly, arbitrageurs might set up the equivalent of an "arbitrage infor-
mation service" and sell their "know-how" to investors at a healthy profit, with the investors in
turn absorbing the slack created by a mandated reduction in professional arbitrageur purchases.
Or, alternatively, arbitrageurs might circumvent inartfully drawn regulations by splitting their
operations among several specially created shell corporations subject to common control.
These potential problems can be handled through careful drafting. See note 148 infra and
text accompanying notes 146-48 infra. Moreover, because arbitrage is an area where substantial
economies of scale come into play, it is very likely that merely splitting up arbitrage operations
would, in itself, substantially eliminate the effects of arbitrage by adversely affecting its profitabil-
ity. See note 150 infra and accompanying text.
147. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(3) (1976).
148. Section 13(d)(3) provides:
(3) When two or more persons act as a partnership, limited partnership, syndicate, or
other group for the purpose of acquiring, holding, or disposing of securities of an issuer,
such syndicate or group shall be deemed a "person" for the purposes of this subsection.
15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(3) (1976). A definition similar to the above could be adapted for use in
regulations governing tender offer arbitrage, perhaps with some additional provisions applying a
control test for commonly held corporations.
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going to occur, it already would have occurred. 149  At present, there
are a very limited number of professional arbitrageurs who dominate
the field for all practical purposes. Although their ranks have increased
somewhat as the profit potential has soared, there has been no dramatic
influx of new participants in the arbitrage game. There is no reason to
anticipate that regulation of arbitrage would reverse this tendency-on
the contrary, it would most likely discourage potential arbitrageurs by
severely curtailing the degree of their possible involvement in arbi-
trage. This is an important factor when one realizes that arbitrage
owes much of its success to economies of scale.1 50
A further possible objection to such a system of regulation is that it
might sweep too broadly by limiting purchases made by non-arbi-
trageurs. The answer to this criticism is that whatever volume limita-
tions ultimately are proposed must carefully weigh the interests in
regulating arbitrage against the benefits of a free and unregulated mar-
ket in order to arrive at a suitable volume figure that will not impair
legitimate purchasers' access to the market. This hypothetical problem
therefore will not be likely to arise under a well-drafted set of regula-
tions, except perhaps in cases where a second competing tender offer is
in the wind and the second offeror attempts to purchase up to the five
percent limit before announcing its offer, 15' or where the target enters
the market to repurchase its own shares. In the first instance, it is ar-
guably not unreasonable to require the second offeror to proceed di-
rectly with its offer in the interest of preserving a fair and efficient
marketplace. In the second situation, it remains, even at present, an
unsettled legal issue the extent to which target management is free to
engage in the repurchase of its own shares as a defensive tactic without
149. See Wyser-Pratte 10. There, the author notes that, throughout the years, many Wall
Street firms and private investors have tried to become involved in risk arbitrage. The author
concludes, however, that "[h]aving neither (a) schooling or experience in the finer points of the
trade, (b) the requisite expert staffs, or [sicl (c) membership in the Community, they tend to fall by
the wayside." Id.
150. See note 137 supra. Not only must the arbitrageur operate on a large-volume scale in
order to realize profits from small per-share differentials, he must also keep up a large turnover so
as to spread out his enormous fixed overhead costs, for example, the expense of running a large
office, hiring staff, maintaining a seat on the NYSE and other related business costs.
151. At present, it is permissible to own beneficially up to five percent of a corporation's stock
without having to file with the SEC. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d), 78n(d) (1976). However, there is
a movement underway to introduce new amendments to the 1934 Act, which would roll back the
five percent threshold where the acquisition was part of an overall takeover scheme and was fol-
lowed by a tender offer. See note 156 infra.
In addition, many offerors will in the future be subject to the waiting period and disclosure
requirements imposed by a new set of FTC rules and regulations, effective September 5, 1978,
issued pursuant to the recently enacted pre-merger notification provisions of section 7A of the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1976). See note 142 supra.
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breaching its fiduciary duty to shareholders. In either event, should it
ultimately be determined that offerors and targets merit special treat-
ment, there will be ample opportunity to provide carefully drafted reg-
ulatory exemptions to address specific objections.' 5 2
A final point pertaining to the proposed regulation of arbitrage is
the observation that additional congressional enabling legislation will
most likely be required to give the SEC power to promulgate rules that
will be upheld by the courts. The regulations proposed here differ
from proposed rule 13e-2 in that they lack explicit statutory support.153
Even with such general support as rule 13e-2 finds in section 13(e)(1) of
the 1934 Act,154 these regulations might be found to be beyond the
SEC's scope of authority under a reading of recent Supreme Court de-
cisions that appear to narrowly construe the securities laws as aimed at
providing only for disclosure and not for substantive regulation, unless
expressly authorized.155  For this reason, it is suggested that if Con-
gress undertakes to reamend the Williams Act so as to overrule the
Supreme Court's decision in Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc.,'15 6 it
152. This Comment does not purport to address the complex problems which may arise in
attempting to create specific regulatory exemptions designed to remedy situations where applica-
tion of the general rule would be unwarranted. It instead assumes that such situations, if they do
arise, will be most appropriately handled by the SEC during the course of its formulation of
arbitrage regulations.
153. Proposed rule 13e-2 finds statutory support in section 13(e) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. §
78m(e) (1976), which provides, inter ala, that the SEC has the authority to promulgate rules and
regulations to define and prevent fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative acts and practices on the
part of issuers of securities registered with the SEC. There is no such explicit support for ruls
which would impose similar restrictions on purchases by anyone while a tender offer is outstand-
ing. At best, such rules could be said to find support in section 10(b) of the 1934 Act. 15 U.S.C. §
78j(b) (1976). However, recent Supreme Court decisions most likely foreclose such an argument,
absent new congressional legislation. See note 156 infra and accompanying text.
154. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(e)(1) (1976). See note 153 su.pra.
155. See cases cited at note 138 supra.
156. 430 U.S. 1 (1977). It is likely that new amendments to the 1934 Act will be introduced in
the Senate in the fall of 1978. The focus of these amendments will be upon tightening existing
regulation of tender offers and correcting what is rightly perceived as an imbalance of regulation
favoring the offeror. Such legislation likely will provide for advance notice of tender offers, will
roll back the five percent threshold filing requirement discussed at note 151 supra and will rein-
state private standing to enforce the provisions of the act, thus effectively overruling the Chris-
Craft decision. Present dissatisfaction with the existing state of tender offer regulation is indi-
cated by the remarks of Senator Harrison Williams, sponsor of the Williams Act, in the introduc-
tion to ARANOW, EINHORN & BERLSTEIN:
[Recent] Supreme Court decisions have had a mixed effect on the attainment of the pur-
poses and policies of the federal securities laws in general, and the tender offer provisions
in particular. While some of the Court's decisions have clarified troubling uncertainties
in the application of the federal securities laws, other decisions may have substantially
changed the contours of litigation under the tender offer statutes in a manner never in-
tended or envisioned by the Congress.
Chris-Craft is a graphic illustration. Since 1968, tender offerors have been bringing
suits against targets, and targets against offerers, to enforce the statute. Few questions
were ever raised as to standing. Early in 1977, however, in Chris-Craft the Court denied
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should also give serious attention to including provisions that would
enable the SEC effectively to regulate tender offer arbitrage activity.
V. CONCLUSION
The propriety of the activities of arbitrageurs has not heretofore
been seriously questioned. Their participation in tender offers has
been regarded as largely beneficial insofar as it provides target share-
holders with a riskless alternative to tendering at a more than adequate
price. Arbitrageurs have been thought to absorb the risks of the tender
offer and facilitate the smooth transition of the market. Their profits
have been viewed as not incommensurate with the risks taken.
This traditional view of arbitrage fails to account for the unbal-
ancing influence of arbitrage on existing tender offer regulation and the
potential long-term deleterious economic consequences that arise from
such imbalance. The participation of arbitrageurs in a tender offer
fundamentally alters the risks bearing upon the success of the offer,
changing its attractiveness to investors. Arbitrageurs can and do offer
prices higher than those which the market would normally fix by its
unbiased operation, exerting an intense and often successful pressure
upon investors to sell into the hands of arbitrageurs, who are commit-
ted to tendering without regard for the underlying merits of the offer.
This results in an imbalance of tender offer regulation favoring the of-
feror and creates the possibility of takeovers "artificially induced" by
arbitrage. The long-term consequences of a system of regulation
which facilitates such importunate takeovers include replacing efficient
managements with inefficient successors, creating enormous costs unre-
lated to productive economic activity, aggravating the "top-heavy" ten-
dency of corporate structures and contributing to an overall
atmosphere of fear, distrust and secrecy among the business commu-
nity inimical to the basic goals of the securities laws.
The parties benefitted by arbitrage have no special claim to protec-
tion. Target shareholders, many of whom are currently receiving a
windfall from the arbitrageur, would be adequately protected by the
unbiased operation of the market absent the effects of arbitrageur inter-
tender offerors standing to obtain damages for violations of the statute. Unquestiona-
bly, this decision will have profound implications for future tender offer litigation. Inmy view, the questions raised were serious enough to warrant consideration of whether
new legislation is required to reestablish the balance between offerors and targets, and to
ensure that the tender offer laws are effectively enforced.
Id xviii.
The author believes that the legislation necessary to enable the SEC effectively to regulate




vention. The arbitrageurs themselves, while admittedly taking risks,
are nevertheless realizing returns incommensurate with those risks.
Moreover, such returns can be consistently realized only because of the
arbitrageurs' unique and near-monopolistic status. These advantages,
enjoyed by arbitrageurs but unattainable by the average investor, give
rise to a need for regulation of arbitrage activity.
Disclosure is not the answer because there is nothing of substance
for the arbitrageur to disclose. Moreover, disclosure would not get at
the root of the problem, which is the arbitrage activity itself. Rather,
what is needed is a system of volume restrictions upon purchases analo-
gous to those outlined in proposed SEC rule 13e-2. In the case of arbi-
trage, such restrictions would be applicable to all purchases on the
market while the tender offer is outstanding, thus accomplishing the
two-fold objective of preventing arbitrageurs from acquiring blocks of
shares sufficiently large to control the outcome of the tender offer while
avoiding the problems which would accompany any attempt to define
arbitrage and to formulate regulations applicable only to arbitrageurs
so defined. By careful drafting, the proposed regulations can effec-
tively check the effects of arbitrage and prevent arbitrageurs from
merely splintering their operations and continuing unabated. Like-
wise, through the exercise of care in arriving at the level of regulation,
the desired results can be achieved without unduly restricting the access
of legitimate investors to the marketplace. Thus, the major focus of
future debate should center around the desirable degree of regulation
of arbitrage-whether it should be partially curtailed or entirely elimi-
nated.
In the meantime, Congress should enact legislation granting the
SEC authority to adequately and effectively deal with this problem by
promulgating rules and regulations as outlined above. It is time for
Congress and the SEC to look beyond the tip of the iceberg if there is to
be a fair and effective balance of regulation in the tender offer field.
Jeffrey Stephen Turner
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